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Abstract In an organisational setting such as an online marketplace, an entity called the
‘organisation’ or ‘institution’ defines interaction protocols, monitors agent interaction, and
intervenes to enforce the interaction protocols. The organisation might be a software system
that thus regulates the marketplace, for example. In this article we abstract over application-
specific protocols and consider commitment lifecycles as generic interaction protocols. We
model interaction protocols by explicitly-represented norms, such that we can operationalise
the enforcement of protocols bymeans of normenforcement, andwe can analyse the protocols
by a logical analysis of the norms. We adopt insights and methods from commitment-based
approaches to agent interaction as well as from norm-based approaches to agent behaviour
governance. First, we show how to use explicitly-represented norms to model commitment
dynamics (lifecycles). Second, we introduce an operational semantics to operationalise norm
enforcement. Third, we showhow to logically analyse interaction protocols bymeans of com-
mitment dynamics and norm enforcement. The model, semantics, and analysis are illustrated
by a running example from a vehicle insurance domain.
Keywords Commitments · Normative organisations · Operational semantics
The foundations of the ideas developed in this article were presented at the COIN workshop at AAMAS’12
[34] and briefly summarized at the AAMAS’12 conference [33].
B Neil Yorke-Smith
nysmith@aub.edu.lb
Mehdi Dastani
M.M.Dastani@uu.nl
Leendert van der Torre
leon.vandertorre@uni.lu
1 Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
2 University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
3 American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon
123
208 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst (2017) 31:207–249
1 Introduction
Asizeable bodyof literature has developed theories about organisations, interactionprotocols,
commitments, and norms. For example, an organisational setting is manifest in the finance
and accounting literature, where regulatory bodies monitor or audit firms, and may fine
violations of regulations or statues, and failures in corporate governance [26].
Andrighetto et al. [3] survey a body of work in multi-agent systems describing decision
making and agent organisations using norms, interaction protocols and commitments. A
central challenge in this literature is to investigate the relation between commitment-based
approaches and norm-based approaches. This article contributes to this challenge by mod-
elling dynamics of commitments (often explained as variety in commitment lifecycle) using
an explicit representation of norms.
First, commitment-based approaches start from the insight that agents’ interactions,
including communication, create and process commitments according to what is called com-
mitment lifecycle. Agents can thus interact, by virtue of which they may create commitments
that may further be for example satisfied or violated. There exists variety in the details of the
commitment lifecycle: for example, differing in the way commitments are created, in which
agent can detach, delegate or cancel commitments, in when commitments are satisfied, or
in how deadlines are enforced. In such approaches, a commitment lifecycle constitutes a
generic interaction protocol describing sequences of actions, including speech acts, through
which commitments are dynamically created and assigned to the interacting agents [43,62].
For example, consider the enactment of a vehicle insurance business protocol, where agents,
including the repair garage, the assessor, the insurer and customer, interact and agree on the
terms of an insurance [68]. This agreement and the further interactions between the agents
dynamically create and assign commitments to the agents.We use this protocol as the running
example in this article.
Second, norm-based approaches start from the general idea that norms regulate the agents’
interaction by incentivizing norm-compliant behaviour and punishing non-compliant behav-
iour. In the literature on norms, it is generally assumed that norms are “explicitly represented”,
“agents can decide whether to follow the norms”, “violation of norms may have conse-
quences for the norm violating agents”, and that norm-based systems specify “how and to
which extent the agents can modify the norms” [3,15]. On the one hand, (artificial) agents
need to explicitly represent norms, which are used in their deliberation and decision making
process [1,17,58]. On the other hand, norms need to be explicitly represented outside the
agents in an entity called the ‘organisation’ or ‘institution’, which monitors and coordinates
agent interaction [10,12,18,30,32]. Moreover, norm-based systems need to be “organised
by means of mechanisms to represent, communicate, distribute, detect, create, modify, and
enforce norms, and mechanisms to deliberate about norms and detect norm violation and ful-
filment” [3,16,19,31,66]. In such approaches, a norm set constitutes an interaction protocol
describing compliant and non-compliant sequences of actions.
The fact that a commitments lifecycle and a norm set can both be seen as constituting
an interaction protocol suggests a fundamental relation between commitment lifecycle and
norms. This relation, which forms themain focus of our article, can be explained by viewing a
commitment cycle from a normative stance and by viewing it as a set of norms that govern the
agents’ interaction by means of commitments. Following this relation, we propose a formal
framework where a commitment lifecycle is modelled as a set of explicitly represented
interaction norms. This framework allows us to operationalize commitment lifecycles, and
to logically analyse and compare them.
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We address the following three research questions in this article:
1. How to generalise commitment lifecycles by modelling them as a set of explicitly-
represented interaction norms? Agent interaction creates and affects the state of the
commitments. This normative view allows us to formulate the conditions under which
commitments are created and their states are affected by a set of norms. The norms, which
are represented as counts-as rules, specify the dynamics of commitments. In addition,
regulation policies, also represented as counts-as rules, are then introduced to cope with
interactions that cause commitments to be violated.
2. How to operationalise commitment lifecycles?Wepresent an operational semantics for
norms. For our purposes, we assume two main processes: themonitoring process checks
for conformance of agents’ interactions to norms (that represent commitment dynamics),
while the enforcement process intervenes to regulates the agents’ interactions based on
regulation policies.
3. How to logically analyse and compare the commitment lifecycles? Since commitment
lifecycles are explicitly represented and operationalized as norms, we can adopt formal
techniques to formally check the (dynamic) properties of commitment lifecycle and
compare them. For example, we can analyse interference between distinct commitments,
and redundancy of norms using techniques from deontic logic [44].
The scope of the article is on monitoring agents’ interaction in an organisational setting.
Other organisation attributes and processes, such as environmental interaction, or roles [5,
13], entities, and the relationships between them [6], are orthogonal to our purpose in this
article. We therefore do not consider other issues discussed in the literature, such as explicit
temporal references in the commitments, roles of the agents, teams and groups, organisational
dynamics, procedural norms [14] and culture [36].
The layout of the article approximately follows the research questions. First, Sect. 2 spec-
ifies the organisational setting and defines agents’ interaction through commitments, and
illustrates this by a commitment lifecycle. Section 3 gives the formal framework of the oper-
ational semantics, showing how to formalise the organisation’s monitoring and enforcement
processes. Section 4 illustrates how to logically analyse interaction protocols and norms,
by proving various properties about a commitment lifecycle. Section 5 demonstrates the
generality of our methodology by considering alternatives of the commitment lifecycle. Sec-
tion 6 situates our contribution in the literature. Section 7 discusses future work and Sect. 8
concludes the article.
2 Organisations, constitutive norms, and commitment lifecycles
In this article we consider an organisation as a coordination environment that supports and
coordinates the interaction of a set of autonomous, rational decision-making entities called
agents.1 In order to support and coordinate agents’ interactions, an organisation needs to
monitor the agents’ interactions and it possibly intervenes when they violate some norms
such as their commitments towards each other. In the sequel, this general idea is explained
in detail. We are indifferent to whether the organisation is either a virtual organisation or a
real organisation [56].
1 With its emphasis on autonomy, this notion of agent differs from that in principal–agent theory common in
economics. At different levels of abstraction, a human being, a firm, a set of firms, and even a country can all
be seen as agents.
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In general, an organisation assumes a set of agents joined together in order to achieve
their individual and joint objectives or interests. For example, agents may join in groups,
coalitions, companies, institutions, or societies to realise some individual or joint objectives.
Various detailed definitions of organisations have been developed in management science
[64], sociology [69], and other social sciences. As usual in interdisciplinary research, there is
no consensus on the best definition, which depends on the use of the concepts in a discipline.
For computational purposes, organisations are typicallymodelled by, for example, concurrent
coordinated systems, coordination mechanisms, collaborative systems, workflow systems,
business processes, electronic institutions, or virtual environments [7,28,29,38,45,47,56,
65–67].
In the context of this article, an organisation monitors and governs the interaction among
agents by means of a set of what we call interaction norms. We also use the term norm-based
organisations to emphasise the role of interaction norms in coordination. We conceive norm-
based organisations as a constituent of normative multi-agent systems, i.e., “multi-agent
system organised by means of mechanisms to represent, communicate, distribute, detect,
create, modify, and enforce norms, and mechanisms to deliberate about norms and detect
norm violation and fulfillment” [3]. In other words, if multi-agent systems are comprised by
a set of agents interacting with each other, then norm-based organisations provide a means
to coordinate the activities of individual agents by means of norms [2,3,11,20,28,30].
2.1 Interaction norms based on commitments
Let us consider a setting where different agents interact by making offers to each other in a
virtual organisational settingwhere the organisationmonitors the offers, creates commitments
and processes them based on the further behaviour of the agents, and generates responses
when the agents behave in a non-compliant manner. For example, following a scenario in the
literature [24], a car insurance agent (the Insurer) offers a customer agent (the vehicle Owner)
that it will validate her car insurance if the premium is paid; it also offers a car repair garage
(the Repairer) that it will approve the assessments and pay the repair costs of the cars for
which the insurance have been validated; and it offers a car damage assessor (the Assessor)
that it will pay for the assessment of car damages if he performs an assessment. Moreover,
the assessor offers the repairer that he will assess car damages if the owner’s insurance is
validated. Finally, the repairer offers the car owner that it will repair her damaged car if the
car insurance is validated.
These offers create various commitments for the involved agents. The subsequent behav-
iours of the agents may either be according to their commitments—or they may violate the
commitments. For example, the car owner may report an accident to her insurer and take the
car to the garage. On certification that the insurance is valid, because the car owner has paid
the insurance premium, the garage accepts the damaged car and contacts the assessor. Since
the insurance is valid, the garage also commences the repair work on the vehicle. The assessor
reports to the insurer, which approves the assessment of damage and pays the assessor for
his work. The garage reports to the insurance company when it has completed the repair, and
with the approval by the insurer of the assessment, the garage then tells the car owner that
the car is ready. The insurer pays the garage.
In this scenario, the behaviours of the agents are perfectly aligned with their offers and
commitments made and there is no need for the organisation to intervene because of viola-
tions of commitments. However, the agents may behave differently and not aligned with their
commitments. For example, the garage might accept a damaged car that has no valid insur-
ance. In such a case, for example, a warning should be sent to the garage or the collaboration
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between the insurer and the garage should be reconsidered. We assume that these responses
to commitment violations are generated by the (external) organisation that aims at supporting
the coordination of activities of the involved agents. Note the nature of the organisation in
the scenario. As described and courts of law notwithstanding, there is no real organisation
invested with the power to monitor agent communication and actions and intervene if com-
mitments are violated. Instead, one can imagine a virtual organisation entered into by all the
agents, or an insurance marketplace that mediates the offers and their enactment.
The insurance claim scenario is described fully by Chopra et al. [24] based on documen-
tation from the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) on the claim process.2 It
shows a situation where a number of agents interact within an organisational setting, making
various offers and thereby creating commitments that in turn govern their further activities.
The important assumption of this article is that the creation of commitments as well as the
evaluation of further behaviours (compliant or non-compliant) of the agents are subject to a
set of interaction norms, and that the exact nature of these interaction norms can vary fromone
organisational setting to another. For example, an offer made by an agent can by itself create
a commitment in one organisational setting, while in another organisational setting an offer
can create a commitment only if both parties explicitly accept the commitments. We would
like to emphasise that interaction norms are different from what we can call domain-specific
norms, such as traffic or financial norms. In contrast to domain-specific norms, interaction
norms create and process commitments among interacting agents based on their observed
behaviours. The aim of this article is therefore to enable analysis and enactment of interaction
norms in different organisational settings.
In our approach, the coordination between agents is realised exogenously at runtime by
means of two continuous processes maintained by the virtual organisation: monitoring and
enforcement. The organisation continuously strives to:
1. monitor the behaviour of interacting agents,
2. evaluate their behaviours based on interaction norms to generate and maintain commit-
ments, and
3. take necessary measures (i.e., implement regulation policies) when commitments are not
followed.
The organisation as we study it, being an exogenous process with authority over the
agents, cannot intervene in the internal decision making of individual agents by, e.g., either
disallowing them to perform actions or forcing them to perform specific actions. In other
words, agents are autonomous in the sense that they choose their own actions. However, if the
organisationwith authority observes an agent not to behave in accordance to its commitments,
then the organisation may intervene and implement a regulation policy, for example, by
imposing a sanction on the agent. In such a case, we say that the agent ‘violates’ the norm,
and that the violating behaviour potentially results in sanctions.
2.2 The commitment lifecycle
The dynamics of commitments depends not only on the organisational setting, as explained
in the previous subsection, but it also depends on the structure of commitments. We consider
commitments that are directional, conditional, and have deadlines. For example, the insurer
agent can be committed to a car owner that if the premium has been paid by the car owner
within two days, then the insurance will be validated within eight days. The dynamics of
commitments is often explained by means of the so-called ‘commitment lifecycle’.
2 www.fsco.gov.on.ca/english/insurance/auto/afterautoaccidentENG.pdf.
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Fig. 1 State transitions of commitment lifecycle [65]
Figure 1 shows a commitment lifecycle adapted fromTelang and Singh [65].We omit here
the suspension and delegation of commitments. In this figure, boxes indicate states of the
commitments and arrows indicate transitions between commitment states. Consider an offer
made by the insurer agent towards the car owner. This offer creates a conditional commitment,
i.e., a commitment in, Conditional state. Should the antecedent of the commitment become
true (i.e., premium is paid), the commitment moves to Detached state. Should the consequent
of the commitment become true (i.e., insurance is validated), it moves to the Satisfied state.
However, should the antecedent of the commitment not become true before its deadline (i.e.,
within two days), then the commitment moves to Expired state. Likewise if the consequent
of a detached commitment does not become true by its deadline (i.e., within eight days), then
the commitment move to Violated state. The commitment move also to Violated state if the
committed agent (i.e., the insurer) cancels the commitment. Finally, the commitment moves
to Terminated state if the committed agent cancels it before it moves to the Detached state,
or if the second agent (i.e., the car owner) releases the committed agent (i.e., the insurer)
once it has moved to the Detached state.
Let us anticipate some observations about commitment dynamics and lifecycles. First, we
believe there is no unique canonical lifecycle for commitments, and in Sect. 5 we present
various versions of commitment lifecycles. Second, we model a commitment lifecycle by a
set of norms that govern the creation and processing of commitments, i.e., we model a com-
mitment lifecycle by means of a set of rules representing the norms that govern the dynamics
of commitments (see Sect. 3). Third, we assume that commitments can be created and their
states can be changed due to either agents’ actions (communication or non-communication
actions) or the state of the organisation. For example, the performance of an offer action by
the insurance agent towards the customer agent creates a conditional commitment that the
insurer will validate the insurance within eight days if the premium is paid by the customer
with two days. This conditional commitment can be changed to a detached commitment if
the premium is paid independent of whether the payment is done by the corresponding agent
or in any other way as long as the payment is accomplished.
We represent interaction norms by counts-as rules. The representation of interaction norms
by counts-as rules follows the idea of Searle [60] by distinguishing brute and institutional
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facts [3,59]. In our work, the commitments constitute the institutional facts. Using counts-as
rules and considering commitments as institutional facts, interaction norms specify under
which organisational circumstances commitments could be created and its states could be
changed. In this way, counts-as rules that represent interaction norms govern the creation and
processing of commitments. This allows us to express norms such as “an offer counts as a
commitment”, or putting it in other words, “an offer creates a commitment”.
As stated in the introduction, our goal in this article is to provide a formal framework
in which we can model, analyse and compare different commitment lifecycles. Our aim is
neither to develop a detailed model of organisations nor to develop yet another computational
model of normative multi-agent systems. Many such models have been proposed already, for
example in the area of deontic logic in computer science [44], or in normative multi-agent
systems workshops [3]. We believe that a commitment lifecycle provides a normative stance
on agents’ interactions and can thus be used to exogenously coordinate agents’ interactions in
organisational settings. Since there are various proposals on commitment cycles, we believe
that the need is now for a generic framework which can accommodate different approaches
to commitment cycles and offers the possibility to compare them. Hence we provide in the
following section an operational semantics for a generic organisation that specifies how
to monitor and regulate agents’ interactions without assuming a specific set of norms or
regulation policies. In particular, the provided semantics assume a set of interaction norms
that encode a specific commitment lifecycle and a set of regulation policies, and ensure that
the interaction norms are enforced bymeans of regulation policies. The operational semantics
is defined by transition rules that specify possible changes that an organisation can undergo
at runtime. Since the interaction norms and regulation policies are assumed to be given and
represented as rules, the transition rules are defined in terms of the application of rules.
3 Modelling commitment lifecyles by norms and regulation policies
We present in this section an operational semantics formalizing the two processes of the
organisation, monitoring and enforcement, that manage agents’ interactions in an organisa-
tional setting.
As anticipated in the last section, our framework distinguishes brute facts from institutional
facts. The brute facts denote either the facts about the physical environment of an organisation
or the facts about the interaction between agents. The institutional facts denote commitments
that are created between the agents. In the rest of this article, we assume a finite set of basic
(brute and institutional) facts and a finite set of agents.
Definition 1 (Environment facts) Let Πe be a finite set of propositional atoms denoting
(basic) facts about the physical environment of an organisation. We assume ,⊥ ∈ Πe. We
define Le to be the propositional language based on Πe using logical connectives ¬ and ∨.
In the rest of the article, we use variables φ, δ to stand for formulas from Le.
A commitment lifecycle specifies the generation and dynamics of commitments based on
agents’ interaction. Action Set 1 below consists of five representative actions that together
specify the commitment lifecycle as presented in Fig. 1. As usual, we distinguish environ-
ment actions, i.e., actions that are performed by an agent in the physical environment of an
organisation, from communication actions, i.e., actions that are performed by an agent to
communicate with other agents. The set of communication actions does not have to be a
complete set of speech acts, as in an agent communication language [43]: it just needs to
123
214 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst (2017) 31:207–249
be sufficient for all state transitions in the commitment lifecycle, as is explained later in this
section.
Action Set 1 Let A be a finite set of agent names and x, y be variables to stand for agent
names. The following is a set of communication action schemes. Each action scheme repre-
sents the set of all possible communication action instances. An action instance is an action
scheme where each variable is instantiated with a specific value. In this case, an agent name
variable is instantiated with a specific agent name and a variable for a formula from Le is
instantiated with a specific formula from Le. For this set of communication action schemes
and in the rest of this article, we abuse the notation of variables and use φx , φy , δx , and δy
(instead of φ and δ) to stand for formulas from Le. We use subscripts x and y to easy the
reading of communication action schemes.
– offer(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx )—x offers y to make φx true (in the environment) by deadline
δx if φy becomes true (in the environment) by deadline δy .
– tell(x, y, φx )—x tells y that x has made φx true (in the environment)
– cancel(x, y, φx )—x cancels its commitment to y to make φx true (in the environment)
– release(x, y, φy)—x releases the commitment of y to make φy true (in the environment)
– failure(x, y, φx )—x informs y that φx cannot be made true in the environment
Now the commitments are specified, let us look at one in detail.
Example 1 In our running example in the insurance scenario, an Insurer agent I can
offer a Repairer agent R that it (the Insurer) will ‘approve the assessment’, denoted
approve-assessment (or aa for short) within 4 days after the agent R ‘validates the
insurance and reports the repair’, denoted insurance-validated∧report-repair
(or iv ∧ rr for short). We use proposition d to denote the fact that the date of valida-
tion and report is a specific date and proposition d+4 to denote the fact that the current
date is 4 days after the validation and report date. This offer action can be represented as
offer(I,R,iv ∧ rr,aa,d,d+4).
We assume the existence of a set of action propositions that hold directly after performing
the corresponding actions. An action proposition denotes the fact that an (environment or
communication) action has been performed. For a given set of communication actions we
assume a corresponding set of atomic communication action propositions that hold directly
after performing the communication actions. Examples of atomic communication action
propositions (corresponding to the communication action from Action Set 1) are the propo-
sitions offered(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ), told(x, y, φx ), cancelled(x, y, φx ), released(x, y, φy),
and failed(x, y, φx ). In the following, we call offered, told, cancelled, etc. the predicate
names of the communication actions. Moreover, for a given environment action α we assume
that the action proposition done(α) that holds directly after performing the environment
action α.
Definition 2 (Action Propositions) Let Le be the language of environment facts and ξ be a
finite set of events consisting of a set of communication actions Com and a disjoint set of
environment actions Act , i.e., ξ = Com∪Act . Let alsoP be the set of predicate names corre-
sponding to the communication actions fromCom.Πact is the set of atomic (communication
or environment) action propositions defined as follows:
Πact = {P(x, y, φ1, . . . , φn) | P ∈ P & x, y ∈ A & φ1, . . . , φn ∈ Le }
∪ {done(α) | α ∈ Act}
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In Definition 2 the assumption is implicitly made that communication (andmore generally
commitment) is always two party. A multicast message could be handled through many
communicative actions, or the language could be extended with more action propositions.
We assume that atomic (communication or environment) action propositions are true in
states following the corresponding (communication or environment) actions.
Example 2 After communication action offer(I,R,iv ∧ rr,aa,d,d+4) the proposition
offered(I,R,iv ∧ rr,aa,d,d+4) will hold. We have the same assumption for the rest of
communication actions. This communication action proposition denotes the fact that agent I
has offered agentR to realiseaa before deadlined+4 ifiv∧rr becomes true before deadline
d. If the Insurer validates the insurance, then done(iv) holds, and thus the antecedent of the
offer is true.
In this article, institutional facts consist only of commitments. As introduced in the last
section, a commitment expresses a social or organisational relationship between two agents.
The view of commitments that we first represent follows that of Singh [62,65], in which
commitments are unilateral, not requiring acceptance by the other party (but therefore not
binding upon them). Later, in Sect. 5, we discuss an alternative view and show how our
methodology can accommodate it also.
Further, as explained in Sect. 2.2, a commitment lifecycle assumes commitments to have
states which change due to the commitment dynamics. We write commitments using the
predicateCs where the superscript s indicates that the commitmentC is in state s. We assume
a set Cstate of commitment states (depending on the commitment lifecycle) and abbreviate
the state names by the commitment labels. For example, for Fig. 1 we can have the following
set of commitment states Cstate = {n, e, c, d, t, s, vc, vt}. In this example set we distinguish
violation due to cancellation (vc) and violation due to time-out (vt). We use predicate C
without a superscript when the state of the commitment is not relevant. It is important to note
that C is neither a second-order predicate nor a modal operator and that we do not aim at
devising a logic to reason about the internal structure of commitments. We can now formally
introduce commitments.
The following definition considers a what we call a commitment state to be an integral part
of a commitment instance, in the sense that a commitment instance is always in a specific state.
Hence, a commitment instance in a specific state, represented by a commitment proposition,
is considered as an institutional fact.We do not consider a commitment state as an institutional
fact.
Definition 3 (Commitments) Let Le be the language of environment facts and Cstates be
a set of labels denoting possible commitment states. Πc is the set of atomic commitment
propositions defined as follows:
Πc = {Cs(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) | s ∈ Cstates & x, y ∈ A & φx , φy, δx , δy ∈ Le}
As noted earlier, a commitment can be interpreted in various ways. For example,
Cc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) can be interpreted as agent x is committed to agent y to bring about
φx before deadline δx if φy is brought about before deadline δy . This is Singh’s interpretation
that we follow until Sect. 5. Another interpretation is that x is committed to y to bring about
φx before δx if φy is brought about “by y” before δy . The deadlines are represented by state
propositions. A deadline is assumed to be reached in a state that satisfies it. For example, a
deadline can be represented by the proposition ‘The date is Thursday, 21st May 2015’. This
deadline is reached in a state where the date is Thursday, 21st May 2015.
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Example 3 Returning to the insurance scenario, commitments between agents model the
contracts and business protocols of the claim process as follows. Note there is an ‘implied’
commitment from insurer to customer: if the insurance has been validated and the car was
damaged, then the car will have been repaired.
– C1 (I to R): if insurance has been validated and the repair has been reported, then the
insurer will have approved the assessment within 4 days and paid for the repair within 7
days
– C2 (I to A): if the assessment has been done, then the insurer will have paid for the
assessment within 5 days
– C3 (A to R): if damages have been reported and the insurance has been validated, then a
damage assessment will have been performed within 2 days
– C4 (R to C): if the insurance has been validated and the car was damaged, then the car
will have been repaired within 10 days
– C5 (I to C): if the premium has been paid, then the insurance will have been validated
within 8 days
Hence, formally, we have a set of commitments as follows. We model the conjunction
in the consequent of C1 by splitting C1 to allow different deadlines for the two parts of the
conjunction. Following Example 1, we use di to denote a specific date i ∈ N and di + n to
denote n days after the date di .
– C1a = C(I,R,insurance-validated ∧ repair-reported,assessment-approved,
d1,d1 + 4)
– C1b = C(I,R,insurance-validated ∧ repair-reported,payment-done, d1,d1 + 7)
– C2 = C(I,A,assessment-done,assessment-paid,d2,d2 + 5)
– C3 = C(A,R,damages-reported∧insurance-validated,assessment-done, d3,d3+
2)
– C4 = C(R,C,insurance-validated ∧ car-damaged,car-repaired, d4,d4 + 10)
– C5 = C(I,C,premium-paid,insurance-validated,d5,d5 + 8)
Example 4 In our running example, consider the first commitment
C1a = C(I,R,iv ∧ rr, aa, d1,d1 + 4) denoting the fact that the insurer is commit-
ted to approve the assessment within 4 days after the repairer validates the insurance and
reports the repair. In other words, agent I ∈ A (as debtor) tells agent R ∈ A (as creditor) that
if proposition iv ∧ rr (the antecedent) is brought about by deadline d1 ∈ Lb then I will
bring about aa ∈ Lb (the consequent) by deadline d1 + 4 ∈ Lb.
We can now define the language of brute and institutional facts.
Definition 4 (Brute/institutional facts) Let Πe, Πact , and Πc be the sets of atomic envi-
ronment, action, and commitment propositions, respectively. Πb = Πe ∪ Πact is the set of
atomic propositions denoting atomic brute facts and Πi = Πc is the set of atomic proposi-
tions denoting atomic institutional facts. Finally, Π = Πb ∪ Πi is the set of propositional
atoms. We define Lb to be the propositional language based on Πb using logical connectives
¬ and ∨, and L to be the propositional language based on Π using logical connectives ¬
and ∨.
In the rest of the article, we use variables ϕ,ψ to stand for formulae from L .
3.1 Norms and regulation policies: syntax
In our model of an exogenous organisation, we assume that individual agents interact with
each other and with their shared physical environment, the agents’ interactions are primar-
ily responsible for the creation and dynamics of commitments, and that the organisation
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monitors the agents’ interactions and manages the creation and dynamics of the commit-
ments. In the rest of this section, we propose to model commitment lifecycles by means of
norms and regulation policies. We present a generic but expressive representation for norms
and regulation policies to model a broad class of commitment lifecyles. We then specify the
exogenous processing of commitments by providing the operational semantics that effectuate
the agents’ interactions in the context of norms and policies that are designed to model a spe-
cific commitment lifecycle. The agents’ (inter)actions are assumed to be observed/received
by the organisation as external events. The evaluation of agents’ (inter)actions as well as
the processing of commitments by the organisation are realised based on the norms and
regulation policies that model a commitment lifecycle.
3.1.1 Interaction norms
A commitment lifecycle can be considered as constituting a set of norms that govern the
agents’ (inter)actions. In other words, a commitment lifecycle can be seen as normatively
specifying the conditions under which agents’ interactions create commitments and process
their dynamics. It is these commitment based norms that are used by an organisation to
evaluate the agents’ interactions to manage commitments. Thus, norms specify how agents’
interactions cause the creation and dynamics of commitments.
Following Searle’s tradition [60], we represent norms by counts-as rules. Searle’s original
formulation of the counts-as construct is of the form “ϕ counts as ψ in the context c”. In
particular, we use ψ to represent a commitment (with a particular state), ϕ to represent the
condition under which commitment ψ should be created or modified, and c to represent the
context. In our case, a context can be, for example, a specific commitment lifecycle that
constitutes the norms, together with the ontology that is used to specify the norms for the
specific application domain such as the insurance scenario. In general, we assume that the
contexts can be defined by the system designer. In the following, we use C to be the set of all
contexts.
Below the subscript n in “⇒n” indicates that the rule represents a norm. This is due to
the use of a similar rule for representing regulation policy later in this section. Thus, the
use of subscript n for norms and later on r for regulation policies distinguishes norms and
regulation policies.
Definition 5 (Norm) Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} ∪ {} be a finite set (of contexts). A norm is an
expression of the form “ϕ ⇒n ψ in c”, where ϕ ∈ L , ψ ∈ Πi , and c ∈ C. For brevity we
write “ϕ ⇒n ψ” for “ϕ ⇒n ψ in ”. We use N to denote the set of all norms.
Since ψ can only be an institutional fact, the norm as defined here can be considered as
a constitutive norm specifying the institutional interpretation of an organisational state that
satisfies ϕ and the context c. It should also be noted that when ϕ and ψ involve one and the
same commitment with different state annotations, the norm specifies the state change of the
commitment.
Example 5 Figure 2 is an example set of norms that models the lifecycle of commitments as
illustrated in Fig. 1. We use here the set of commitment state labels S = {c, d, s, vc, t, e} and
the set of communication actions as presented in Action Set 1. These norms are explained
below.
1. Performing action “x offers to y that x realizes φx before δx if y realizes φy before
δy” counts as creation of a conditional commitment. The application of this rule,
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1 offered(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ⇒n Cc(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c1
2 told(y, x, φy) ∧ Cc(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ ¬δy ∧ φy ⇒n Cd(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c1
3 told(x, y, φx) ∧ Cc(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ ¬δy ∧ φx ⇒n Cs(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c1
4 told(x, y, φx) ∧ Cd(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ ¬δx ∧ φx ⇒n Cs(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c1
5 cancelled(x, y, φx) ∧ Cd(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ ¬δx ∧ ¬φx ⇒n Cvc(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c1
6 failed(y, x, φy) ∧ Cc(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ ¬δy ∧ ¬φy ⇒n Ce(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c1
7 cancelled(x, y, φx) ∧ Cc(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ ¬δy ∧ ¬φy ⇒n Ct(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c1
8 released(y, x, φy) ∧ Cd(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ ¬δx ∧ φy ⇒n Ct(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c1
Fig. 2 Example context 1 (c1). Counts-as rules specify the lifecycle of commitments based on communication
actions
which we refer to as rule 1, by the organisation will add conditional commitment
Cc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ), considered as an institutional fact, to the set of institutional
facts. Superscript c denotes conditional state of commitment; similar convention is used
for other commitment states.
2. Performing action “y tells x that φy is realized” when δy is still not passed (does not
hold) counts as detaching the conditional commitment. The application of this rule 2
will lead to the removal of the conditional commitment from institutional facts and adds
a corresponding detached commitment to it. Detaching a commitment based on telling
assumes that y is a trusted agent, i.e., its utterances are according to its beliefs. An
organisation may develop a list of trusted agents.
3. Performing action “x tells y that φx is realized” when δy is still not passed counts as satis-
fying the conditional commitment. The application of this rule 3 removes the conditional
commitment from institutional facts and adds a corresponding satisfied commitment to
it.
4. Performing action “x tells y that φx is realized” when δx is still not passed counts as
satisfying the detached commitment. The application of this rule 4 removes the detached
commitment from institutional facts and adds a corresponding satisfied commitment to
it.
5. Performing action “x cancels to realizes φx” when δx is still not passed counts as the
violation of the detached commitment. The application of this rule 5 removes the detached
commitment and adds a corresponding violated commitment.
6. Performing action “y fails to realize φy” when δy is still not passed counts as expiration
of the conditional commitment. The application of this rule 6 removes the conditional
commitment and adds a corresponding expired commitment.
7. Performing action “x cancels to realize φx” when δy is still not passed counts as termina-
tion of the conditional commitment. The application of this rule 7 removes the conditional
commitment and adds a corresponding terminated commitment to it.
8. Performing action “y releases a detached commitment afterφy has been satisfied”when δx
is still not passed counts as termination of the conditional commitment. The application
of this rule 8 removes the detached commitment from institutional facts and adds a
corresponding terminated commitment to it.
Note that Fig. 2 does not contain norms that are based on environment actions, i.e., actions
that when performed change the factual/physical state of the environment. Such norms, which
depend on the application domain at hand, can be represented by counts-as rules as well.
Figure 3 gives some domain-dependent norms represented as counts-as rules. For example,
the first norm indicates that a conditional commitment with φy as its condition counts-as a
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1 done(α(y)) ∧ Cc(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ ¬δy ∧ φy ⇒n Cd(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c2
2 done(α(x)) ∧ Cc(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ ¬δy ∧ φx ⇒n Cs(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c2
3 done(α(x)) ∧ Cd(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ ¬δx ∧ φx ⇒n Cs(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c2
Fig. 3 Example context 2 (c2). Counts-as rules specify the lifecycle of commitments based on non-
communication actions. α(x) denotes an action by agent x
1 Cd(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ δx ⇒n Cvt(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c3
2 Cc(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ δy ⇒n Ce(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c3
Fig. 4 Example context 3 (c3). Counts-as rules specify the lifecycle of commitments based on environment
events. Commitments have to be fulfilled strictly before the deadline is true
detached commitmentwhenever conditionφy is satisfied by some domain actionα performed
by the corresponding agent y before deadline proposition δy .
We allow brute facts to change as a consequence of the internal mechanism of the environ-
ment, e.g., the state of a clock changes automatically. Such changes may have direct impacts
on commitments in the sense that the state of the existing commitments may change. For
example, a commitment may change its state from detached to violated if the environment
make a transition (time elapses) through which the deadline (a brute fact) becomes true. Note
that such commitment dynamics do not depend on agents’ actions, but they are rather based
on state transitions due to the internal mechanism of the environment. Such dynamics of
commitments can also be captured through norms represented by counts-as rules.
Figure 4 lists some examples of norms that govern the dynamics of commitments due to
the internal mechanism of the environment. Note that the antecedent of these counts-as rules
do not require the performance of any agent action.
– The elapse of deadline δx counts as the violation of a detached commitment. The appli-
cation of this rule 1 in Fig. 4 removes the detached commitment from institutional facts
and adds a corresponding violated commitment to it.
– The elapse of deadline δy counts as expiration of a conditional commitment. The applica-
tion of this rule 2 in Fig. 4 removes the conditional commitment from institutional facts
and adds a corresponding expired commitment to it.
3.1.2 Interaction regulation
Norms specify how agents’ interactions cause the creation and dynamics of commitments. In
addition to norms, we introduce the concept of regulation policy to allow an organisation to
intervene in agents’ interactions or to enforce commitment dynamics. The idea of regulation
policy is thus to allow the management of commitments to be independent, or indirectly
dependent, on the agents’ interactions. For example, a regulation policy in the insurance
scenario may intervene and send a warning to a garage (or even to terminate its collaboration
with insurance companies) that has accepted damaged cars without valid insurances. Another
regulation policy may be to invalidate an existing insurance because of an unpaid bill, which
in turn may cause a commitment to be violated unless the payment is fulfilled immediately.
In this sense, a regulation policy can be used to model application-dependent issues that
are relevant for the management of commitments. We stress that although most existing
commitment lifecycles canbemodelled by a set of norms, the introduction of regulation policy
enriches and extends the class of commitment lifecycles with application dependent issues
that are relevant for the creation and dynamics of commitments. Following the representation
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of norms, regulation policies can be represented by means of rules as well. As noted before,
we use subscript r to distinguish rules representing regulation policies from rules representing
norms.
Definition 6 (Regulation policy) LetΠe be the set of negated atomic facts about the physical
environment, i.e., Πe = {¬p | p ∈ Πe}. A regulation policy is an expression of the form
“ϕb ∧ ϕi ⇒r ψ in c”, where ϕb ∈ Lb, ϕi = p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn for pi ∈ Πi and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
ψ ∈ Πe ∪ Πe, and c ∈ C. For brevity we write “ϕ ⇒r ψ” for “ϕ ⇒r ψ in ”. We use R to
denote the set of all regulation policies.
The antecedent of a regulation policy is a conjunction of ϕb, which denotes a brute fact,
and ϕi , which denotes a an institutional fact. The institutional fact is in turn represented
by a conjunction of institutional atoms. The reason for keeping brute and institutional facts
separately, and taking the conjunction of institutional atoms instead of arbitrary institutional
formula, is to allow removing institutional facts after the policy being applied (see Defini-
tion 11 for more details). As we explain later, removing institutional facts may influence the
application of other regulation policies that contain some of the removed institutional atoms
in their antecedent. Therefore, we emphasize that the regulation policies should be designed
cautiously by taking the operational semantics and the applications of regulation policies into
account.
This definition does not allow a regulation policy to create new commitments in order
to respond to the existing institutional facts. For example, a regulation policy can specify
a response that warns a garage which violates its commitment to a car owner to repair her
car with valid insurance, but a regulation cannot create a new commitment that obliges the
garage to still repair the car (recall the discussion at the end of Sect. 2.1). However, a new
commitment can be created as the consequence of some institutional facts bymeans of norms
(often seen as ‘contrary-to-duty’ norms). Thus, we consider regulation policy as changing
the brute state (and not institutional state) of the organisation; the institutional state of an
organisation can be changed merely by means of norms.
Example 6 Here we give some examples of regulation policies for the insurance scenario.
We use c10 to denote the context of the insurance scenario, which is exactly the combined
context of c1, c2 and c3. Recall that we do not perform calculation with deadlines, but assume
some kind of calendar logic [54].
1. The Insurer’s commitments towards the Assessor and Repairer come with penalty poli-
cies, by which the Insurer have to pay the Assessor a penalty if the Insurer is late in
approving a valid assessment and pay the Repairer a penalty if the Insurer is late in pay-
ing for a completed repair. These penalties are modelled by the following two regulation
policies:
Cvt1a ⇒r pay(I,A, p1a) in c10
Cvt1b ⇒r pay(I,R, p1b) in c10
where p1a and p1b are the amounts of the respective penalties. Note that we use Cvt1a
to abbreviate commitment Cvt1a(I,R,iv ∧ rr,aa,d1,d1 + 4). We also use Cvt1b as an
abbreviation of the commitment with the same arguments as in Cvt1a . This notational
choice is used for the following regulation rules as well.
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There are also penalties if the Insurer fails to approve the assessment or pay for the repair,
respectively, because it cancels the commitment:
Cvc1a ⇒r pay(I, A,p′1a) in c10
Cvc1b ⇒r pay(I, R,p′1b) in c10
where p′1a and p′1b are the amounts of the respective penalties.
2. The Insurer’s commitment towards the Assessor comes also with a penalty policy, by
which the Insurer will pay the Assessor a penalty if the Insurer is late in paying for a
completed assessment. This penalty is modelled by the following regulation policy:
Cvt2 ⇒r pay(I, A,p2) in c10
where p2 is the amount of the penalty. There is a further regulation policy that penalizes
the Insurer for cancelling the commitment, similar to C1a and C1b.
3. We suppose a penalty policy in the insurance scenario, whereby the Insurer guarantees
that properly-reported eligible car damage will be repaired within 10 days. This applies to
commitmentC4. Note that it is the Insurer who makes this guarantee to the Customer, not
the Repairer. One could model the guarantee by an additional commitment from Insurer
to Customer (not shown); the deadline on the consequent in C4 derives from this. As we
have it the guarantee is modelled in C4 and the following regulation policy:
Cvt4 ⇒r pay(I, C, ¤ 200) in c10
which is applied for any delay beyond the deadline. This rule models the penalty clause
upon the Insurer which states that the Insurer will compensate the Customer for delayed
repairs by the amount of 200 euros. There is a further regulation policy that similarly
penalizes the Insurer for cancelling the commitment.
4. We suppose that the Insurer is part of the national association of insurers. The best practice
guidelines of the association state that an insurer should validate a customer’s insurance
within eight days, provided the customer has pay the premium. This is reflected inC5. The
association will send a reprimand to the Insurer if it violates its guidelines. The following
regulation policy models this:
Cvt5 ⇒r reprimand(Association, Insurer) in c10
As with the other commitments, there is a similar regulation policy if the Insurer cancels
the commitment.
Note that in our operational semantics, violation states are deleted once the regulation
policies have been applied. Hence with the norms we consider in this article, one cannot
model policies according to which violations are sanctioned repeatedly or continually until
the commitment is satisfied. For example, we cannot model a penalty such as reducing the
payment for the assessment by 20% for each day it is late (up to a maximum of 5 days delay,
whereupon no payment is due). However, our framework can model repeated regulation, if
a different set of norms is adopted in the operational semantics.
A special use of regulation policy is to regiment norms, i.e., make it impossible to violate
the norms [52]. This regimentation is realized by preventing the creation of institutional facts
related to the norm. For example, one can regiment the norm that a commitment cannot
be cancelled by preventing the creation of the institutional fact Cvc. In our framework, a
norm can be regimented by a regulation policy, represented by a rule, where the institutional
fact that is generated by the norm is the antecedent of the rule and the brute fact ⊥ is the
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consequent of the rule. Our example of regimenting the norm not to cancel a commitment
can be represented by the following regulation policy rule:
Cvc1a ⇒r ⊥
As discussed below in Sect. 3.2.1 on operational semantics, the application of a regulation
policy that is designed to regiment a normwill not cause any inconsistency in our framework.
As explained there, the application of rules with ⊥ in the consequent does not add ⊥ to the
organisation state to cause inconsistency, but it prevents the organisation to make a transition.
In other words, the operational semantics assure that the actions that trigger such a policy to
be applied will have no effect and will therefore not cause any inconsistency.
An organisation can now be specified in terms of brute facts, a specific organisational
context, a set of norms, and a set of regulation policies.
Definition 7 (Organisation specification) Let N be the set of all norms and R be the set
of all regulation policies, as defined in Definitions 5 and 6, respectively. An organisation
specification is a tuple (F, c, N , R), where F ⊆ Πb is a finite set of brute facts, c ⊆ C is a
finite set of contexts, N ⊂ N is a finite set of norms, and R ⊂ R is a finite set of regulation
policies.
Example 7 The organisation in the insurance claims scenario can be specified by ({ d0 }, c,
N , R), where c = {c10}, N consists of the norms listed in Example 5 and R consists of the
policies listed in Example 6. The set of brute facts is initially assumed to contain only the
state proposition d0 denoting the initial date of the organisation is a certain date.
3.2 Norms and regulation policies: operational semantics
We build up the operational semantics for an organisation through several steps. We start
by defining an organisation state and derive the initial state of an organisation from its
specification. The execution of an organisation—during which the organisation monitors
events, evaluates them, and intervenes based on regulation policies—changes the state of
the organisation and results in a sequence of organisation states. In the following, we use
ξ as the set of events including agents’ actions performed in a shared environment, agents’
communication, and changes of the state of the shared environment caused by its internal
mechanism (e.g., the passing of the time). Such changes are important as they may bring
some commitments to a violation state. For example, the elapse of time can cause a deadline
to be reached which consequently may make a commitment be violated. In order to define
the executions of an organisation, we present some transition rules that specify possible
execution steps.
Definition 8 (Organisation state) Let σb ⊆ Πb be a finite set of brute facts, let σi ⊆ Πi
be a finite set of institutional facts, c ⊆ C a finite set of contexts, N ⊂ N a finite set of
norms, and R ⊂ R a finite set of regulation policies. A state of an organisation is a tuple
〈σb, σi , c, N , R〉.
The initial state of an organisation is determined by its specification (see Definition 7).
We assume that institutional facts are generated at runtime such that an organisation initially
has no institutional facts. Finally, we assume that the context, norms, and regulation policies
are given and do not change at runtime. The latter assumption can be relaxed by including
additional meta-policies that indicate how the context, norms, and regulations can change at
runtime. We leave aside this aspect, and the related issue of dynamic role assignment [32],
as our aim is to focus on normative and regulative aspects of organisations.
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Definition 9 (Initial organisation state) Let (F, c, N , R) be the specification of an organisa-
tion. The initial state of the organisation is 〈F,∅, c, N , R〉, i.e., the initial brute facts is given
by the organisation specification and the initial institutional facts is the empty set.
For brevity, we omit N , R, and c from the organisation states and represent an organisation
state as 〈σb, σi 〉. However, we use N , R, and c in the transition rules to determine the next
organisation state based on the current state, and assume they are static ingredients of the
configurations.
Example 8 Consider the insurance organisation as specified in Example 7. The initial state
of the insurance organisation is 〈{ d0 },∅, c, N , R〉. Assuming that c, N , and R do not change
during the execution of the organisation, we omit them from the organisation states in the
following examples.
3.2.1 Transition rules
The behaviours of a set of agents that interact with each other (communication) and with
a shared environment, as well as the behaviour of the shared environment caused by its
internal mechanism, are processed in the context of an organisation, which is specified by
a set of norms and a set of regulation policies. In particular, these behaviours are processed
by applying norms and regulation policies. The application of norms and regulation policies
constitutes a possible execution step of an organisation. In order to capture such an execution
step by means of a transition rule, we first define an application function that determines
applicable rules.
Definition 10 (Applicable rules, antecedent and consequent of rules) Let λ be a finite set
of either norms or regulation policies (i.e., either λ ⊂ N or λ ⊂ R), R ⊂ R, Π the set of
propositional atoms, Πi be the set of propositional atoms denoting institutional facts, and c
a set of contexts. The function App : 2Π × 2λ × 2C → 2λ selects a subset of rules from
λ that are applicable in states specified by X ∈ Π and contexts c. Moreover, we specify
the functions cond : 2R → 2Πi∪Πi and cons : 2λ → 2Π∪Π to collect propositional atoms
involved in the antecedent and consequent of a set of (applicable) rules, and define them as
follows:
– cons(λ) = {ψ | (φ ⇒ ψ in c) ∈ λ}, and
– cond(R) = {p1, . . . , pm | (ϕb ∧ p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pm ⇒r ψ in c) ∈ R, ϕb ∈ Lb, pi ∈ Πi },
Note that the function cond is only applicable to regulation policies, while the function
cons is applicable to both norms as well as regulation policies.
There are various ways to define the application function. Examples 9 and 10 illustrate
two possibilities for defining the App function.
Example 9 Let X ⊆ Π be a finite set of propositional atoms, λ a finite set of rules (either
λ ⊂ N or λ ⊂ R), sX the state that is specified by X , c a set of contexts. The following
example of the App function does not involve iteration of rules applications.
App(X, λ, c) = {(ϕ ⇒ ψ in c) ∈ λ | sX | ϕ & c ∈ c}
There are various ways to determine sX . One possibility is by applying the closed-world
assumption, i.e., ∀p ∈ Π : sX | p if p ∈ X and sX | ¬p if p /∈ X .
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A disadvantage of this definition of App is that the applicability of one rule does not
trigger other rules to become applicable, i.e., rule application is assumed not to iterate. The
iteration of rule application may be of particular importance for computing the consequences
of the so-called interlocking norms (e.g., contrary-to-duty norms). These norms are often
represented by rules such that the consequent of one rule is the antecedent of other rules. An
advantage of the non-iterative definition is, however, its low computational load. Following
this definition, the computation of norm consequences is linear in the size of the norm set.
The following example obtains iteration by taking the closure of applicable rules for a set
of propositional atoms and a context. The closure of applicable rules from a set of rules λ, a
set of propositional atoms X and a set of contexts c is similar to the App function as defined
above to compute applicable rules in one round. The closure ensures that the outcome of one
round is used to compute applicable rules in the next round.
Example 10 Let clλ,cX (Y ) = {(ϕ ⇒ ψ in c) ∈ λ | sX∪cons(Y ) | ϕ & c ∈ c}, i.e., given a
set of applicable rules Y ⊆ λ the next set of applicable rules from λ are determined by also
taking the consequent of the rules in Y . The iterative version of the rule application function,
also represented by the function App(X, λ, c), can now be defined as the least fixed-point of
clλ,cX (·). This fixed point provides the set of all applicable rules.
It should be emphasized that using the definition of sX , as given in Example 9, together
with the rules that represent norms and policies, may cause the application of a rule in one
iteration round to invalidate the application of a rule in a previous iteration round. Again,
we can choose among various definitions of sX or various classes of rules, depending on the
properties that are identified as desirable by the system designer. We provide some properties
that hold for the iterative version of rule application using sX , as given in Example 9, and a
certain class of norms and policies.
We assume that events (either agents’ actions or actions from the environment) can change
the brute as well as the institutional states of an organisation. In the following, we assume
a function effect : ξ → 2Πb∪Πb that determines the brute and communication fact con-
sequences of an action. For example, effect(approve(a)) = {aa, done(approve(a))}
indicates that the brute effect of approving an assurance approve(a) is that the assurance is
approved aa and the approve action is performed, i.e., done(approve(a)). The processing
of agents (inter)actions, which modifies the state of the organisation, is defined by the follow-
ing transition rule.We also assume an update function⊗ : 2Πb ×2Πb∪Πb → 2Πb that updates
a finite set of brute facts based on a finite set of brute literals. This update function can be as
simple as adding positive literals and removing negative literals from the set of brute facts.
For example, ⊗({p}, {¬p, q}) = {q} and ⊗({p}, {¬p, q, r,¬r}) = ⊗({p}, {¬p, q}) = {q}.
Again, one may choose among various definitions of ⊗ depending on some given desirable
properties at hand.
Definition 11 (Transition rules) Let N be a finite set of norms, R a finite set of policies, c
a set of contexts, and App an application function. Also let ⊗ be an update function. The
following transition specifies how the organisation state changes based on event α.
⊥ /∈ σ ′b
〈σb, σi 〉 α−→ 〈σ ′b, σ ′i 〉
⊥ ∈ σ ′b
〈σb, σi 〉 α−→ 〈σb, σi 〉
(1)
The updated sets of brute and institutional facts (i.e., σ ′b and σ ′i , respectively) are computed
in two consecutive steps through σ ∗b and σ ∗i , respectively. The computation of these sets are
specified below.
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1. σ ∗b = ⊗(σb, effect(α)) is the update of brute facts σb based on the consequences of event
α.
2. σ ∗i = σi \ {Cx (V ) | Cy(V ) ∈ A} ∪ A is the update of institutional facts with the
consequences of applicable norms, where x, y are commitment states, V is the vector of
arguments of the commitment, and A = cons(App(σi ∪ σ ∗b , N , c)).
3. σ ′b = ⊗(σ ∗b \ Πact , cons(App(σ ∗b ∪ σ ∗i , R, c))) is the second (final) update of the brute
facts with the consequences of applicable regulation policies. Note that communication
acts Πact are not stored in the set of brute fact in order to prevent repeated application
of norms.
4. σ ′i = σ ∗i \cond(App(σ ∗b ∪σ ∗i , R, c)) is the set of institutional facts. Note that institutional
facts for which a regulation policy is applied are removed such that a policy for an
institutional fact is applied only once.
The left transition rule in (1) ensures that the performance of event α changes the state of
the organisation when the triggered and applied norms are not regimented by any regulation
policy, i.e., when⊥ is not generated through the application of policies. By contrast, the right
transition rule ensures that the state of the organisation does not changewhen the performance
of α triggers the application of norms that are regimented by dedicated regulation policies.
According to these transition rules, the state of a multi-agent organisation can make a
transition when event α is monitored, i.e., event α ∈ ξ is either an agent’s action or a change
in the environment. In these transition rules, the set of brute facts σb is first updated with
the brute fact consequence of α which results in σ ∗b . Then, the set of institutional facts σi
are updated by applying the norms to determine new commitments or change the state of
the existing commitments. The state of commitments are changed by first generating new
commitments from applicable norms (i.e., computing the set A of new commitments), then
deleting from σi all commitments that are also in A (but have possibly a different state),
and finally adding the newly generated commitments A to σi . This sequence of operations,
which can change the state of the commitments, results in an update of the set of institutional
facts σ ∗i . Third, the updated set of brute facts σ ∗b is updated again; this time based on the
set of regulation policies and the newly generated institutional facts σ ∗i . This second update
determines the brute consequences of the policies based on newly generated commitments.
This results in the (final) set of brute facts σ ′b. Finally, the set of institutional facts σ ∗i is
modified by removing all institutional facts for which a regulation policy has been applied.
This step, which results in the (final) set of institutional facts σ ′i , prevents to apply one and
the same regulation policy more than once.
The update of brute facts can be as simple as adding and removing atomic brute facts by
assuming the brute consequence of events as a set of brute literals. The update of institutional
facts, as defined in this transition, is also as simple as adding and removing commitments
(atomic institutional facts) to/from institutional facts. In particular, new commitments, or new
state of existing commitments, are computed by taking the consequence of the applicable
norms. Note again that the existing commitments for which a new state is computed (i.e.,
{Cx (V ) | Cy(V ) ∈ A}) are removed from institutional facts and the result is updated with the
outcome of A. This operation guarantees that the state of commitments changes according to
the transitions in the commitment lifecycle depicted in Fig. 1 if we use norms as represented
by the counts-as rules from Fig. 2.
We emphasize that the provided operational semantics assumes a set of norms and regula-
tion policies, which should be designed with care and relative to this operational semantics.
For example, in the final step to determine σ ′i the removal of institutional facts may have
implications for the application of other regulation policies in the next transition steps. In par-
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ticular, the removal of institutional facts may make policies that involve some of the removed
institutional facts in their antecedents inapplicable. A reviewer of this article helpfully noted
that one may want a regulation policy with the aim of changing the state of a commitment
from detached to violation, by designing a policy rule with the detached commitment in the
antecedent and a brute fact in the consequent. The brute fact should then lead the detached
commitment to move to the violation state through a norm in the next transition step. In
our view, the norm and regulation policy as sketched by the reviewer do indeed not meet
the expected objective of the reviewer, although we would like to stress the suggested norm
and regulation policy can be desirable if the reviewer had a different objective. For example,
suppose one would like to bring a detached commitment to a violated state, unless the agents
perform a repair action. The proposed norm and regulation policy ensure that the detached
commitment will be moved to a violated state in the next state unless the agents perform a
repair action. Again, we think that these are modelling issues and that norms and regulation
policies should be designed carefully having the operational semantics in mind.
3.2.2 Properties
Given the transition rules as defined in Definition 11, the following proposition ensures that
derivable transitions are sound in the sense that derivable transitions involve well-defined
organisation states.
Proposition 1 Let 〈σb, σi 〉 be an organisation state, and 〈σb, σi 〉 α−→ 〈σ ′b, σ ′i 〉 a transition
derived by applying the transition rules from Definition 11. We have that 〈σ ′b, σ ′i 〉 is an
organisation state.
Proof Follows directly from Definition 11 and the assumptions ⊗ : 2Πb × 2Πb∪Πb → 2Πb
and cons(N ) ⊂ Πi for a set of norms N . The assumptions ensure that σ ′b ⊆ Πb, σ ′i ⊆ Πi ,
and that σ ′b and σ ′i are finite sets. unionsq
Although the above proposition establishes a general desirable property of the operational
semantics, other properties may be relevant only for specific purposes or applications. For
example, to formally analyse norms, policies and their consequences may require isolating
the application of norms and policies in single transition steps, i.e., requiring that an agent’s
action causes relevant norms and policies to be applied directly after the performance of the
action. Otherwise, an agent’s action may cause norms and policies to be applied in successive
transitions, possibly interfering with norms and policies that are triggered by other agents’
actions. This would make it hard, if not impossible, to properly analyse norms, policies
and their consequences. The following propositions formulate some conditions under which
all applicable norms and/or regulation policies are applied in one single transition step. In
particular, the following proposition shows that imposing certain restriction on regulation
policies ensures that all applicable regulation policies are applied in one single transition
step. In the following propositions, we use AtomA(λ) (and AtomC(λ)) to denote the set of
propositional atoms involved in the antecedent (and consequent) of rules λ, which can be
either norms or regulation policies.
Proposition 2 Let App(X, R, c) be defined as in Example 9 or Example 10, R be a finite
set of regulation policies, and 〈σb, σi 〉 α−→ 〈σ ′b, σ ′i 〉 be a transition derived by applying the
transition rules fromDefinition 11. Then, if AtomA(R)∩AtomC(R) = ∅, then no regulation
policy in R is applicable in organisation state 〈σ ′b, σ ′i 〉, i.e.,
{(ϕ ⇒r ψ in c) ∈ R | σ ′b ∪ σ ′i | ϕ} = ∅
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Proof Following Proposition 1 we have that 〈σ ′b, σ ′i 〉 is an organisation state and follow-
ing Definition 8 we have that σ ′b ∪ σ ′i is consistent. Moreover, the fact that AtomA(R) ∩
AtomC(R) = ∅ ensures that the outcomes of the iterative and non-iterative applications of
policies (Examples 9, 10) become identical. Clause 4 in Definition 11 ensures then that no
regulation policy is applicable in 〈σ ′b, σ ′i 〉 as it ensures that there are no institutional facts in
σ ′i that can trigger a regulation policy. unionsq
Note that the regulation policies as presented in our running example satisfy the condition
AtomA(R) ∩ AtomC(R) = ∅.
Norms and regulation policies may interact in such a way that the subsequent occurrence
of one and the same event (agents’ actions) makes norms to become applicable in successive
transitions. Therefore, the design of norms and regulation policies is crucial for the behaviour
of the transition system. The following proposition shows that under specific conditions the
subsequent occurrence of an event has no new effects.
Proposition 3 Let App(X, R, c) be defined as in Example 9 or Example 10, N be a set of
norms, and R be a set of regulation policies. If AtomA(λ) ∩ AtomC(λ) = ∅ for λ = N or
λ = R, and AtomA(N ) ∩ AtomC(R) = ∅ then we have:
〈σb, σi 〉 α−→ 〈σ ′b, σ ′i 〉 α−→ 〈σ ′b, σ ′i 〉
Proof Let 〈σb, σi 〉 α−→ 〈σ ′b, σ ′i 〉 and suppose thatα is applied again such that the state 〈σ ′′b , σ ′′i 〉
is obtained, i.e., 〈σ ′b, σ ′i 〉
α−→ 〈σ ′′b , σ ′′i 〉. First note that the constraint AtomA(λ)∩AtomC(λ) =∅ for λ = N or λ = R ensures that the outcomes of the iterative and non-iterative applications
of rules (Examples 9 and 10) become identical. Following the four clauses of the definition
of transition rule in Definition 11, note that the computation of σ ′b and σ ′i results in the
consequences of applicable policies from R. Then, on the second application of event α,
the first two clauses of the definition the computation of σ ′∗b and σ ′
∗
i applies respectively
the consequences of α, which have already been applied, and the applicable norms from N .
However, since AtomA(N ) ∩ AtomC(R) = ∅, there are no applicable norms on σ ′i , and
hence the second clause does not make a change. Hence 〈σ ′′b , σ ′′i 〉 = 〈σ ′b, σ ′i 〉. unionsq
Note again that norms and regulation policies as presented in our running example satisfy
the conditions as formulated in the above proposition.
The following example illustrates the working of the operational semantics.
Example 11 (Agents communicate) Let 〈{ d0 },∅〉 be the (initial) state of the insurance
organisation (c, N , and R are omitted). Suppose the Insurer communicates with the Repairer
and offers him to approve the assessment of a repaired car within 4 days from the date d
that the Repairer reports the repair and the insurance of the repaired car has been validated.
This communication action is represented by event “offer(I,R,iv ∧ rr,aa,d,d+4)”. In
our running example, the left transition rule can be applied to derive the following transition.
〈{ d0 },∅〉 offer(I,R,iv∧rr,aa,d,d+4)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈{ d0 }, {Cc(I,R,iv ∧ rr,aa,d,d+4)}〉
where a new commitment in conditional state is created. For this example, we assume that
effect(offer(I,R,iv∧ rr,aa,d,d+4)) = {offered(I,R,iv∧ rr,aa,d,d+4)} (i.e., there
is no brute fact consequence but only a communication fact consequence offered(I,R,iv∧
rr,aa,d,d+4)) and d0,d, and d+4 are different date propositions. The application of
norms N (in the set of contexts c) to this communication fact generates a commitment (in
conditional state), which is subsequently added to the set of institutional facts by means of
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the update operator ⊗. Finally, the communication fact offered(I,R,iv ∧ rr,aa,d,d+4)
does not remains in the set of brute facts of the resulting state of the organisation.
Monitoring two subsequent but identical offers result in an organisation state that is iden-
tical to the organisation state that is achieved after monitoring the first occurrence of the offer,
i.e., two subsequent but identical offers result to one and the same commitment. Two identi-
cal/equivalent offers can be made different/non-equivalent by for example using propositions
with time stamps (see Sect. 4 for a more general analysis).
Example 12 (Environment changes) Let the organisation of our running example be in state
〈{ d0 }, {Cc(I,R,iv ∧ rr,aa,d,d+4)}〉 and the time elapses such that the current date
d0 of the organisation moves to the next date denoted by d1. This event (passing of time),
represented by d0 → d1, causes the left transition rule to apply and the following transition
to be derived:
〈{ d0 },{Cc(I,R,iv ∧ rr,aa,d,d+4)}〉
d0→d1−−−−→
〈{ d1 },{Cc(I,R,iv ∧ rr,aa,d,d+4)}〉
We assume that propositions d0 and d1 cannot hold in the same state and that d1 states
occur after d0 states. We also assume that d1 is different to d and d+4 and that they do
not hold in the same state. Note that the set of institutional facts is not changed as this time
change does not make any norm (from Fig. 2) to become applicable.
The following example demonstrates a further execution of the multi-agent organisation
as described above.
Example 13 (Agents communicate) Suppose now that on date d1 the Repairer agentR com-
municates with the Insurer agent I and reports the repair of the car with a valid insurance
iv ∧ rr. The communication actions causes the application of the left transition rule and
derives the following transition.
〈{ d1 }, {Cc(I,R,iv ∧ rr,aa,d,d+4)}〉
tell(R,I,iv∧rr)−−−−−−−−−→
〈{ d1, iv ∧ rr}, {Cd(I,R,iv ∧ rr,aa,d,d+4)}〉
This transition takes place by applying the transition rule for events (Definition 11) due to the
tell action (assuming effect(tell(R, I,iv ∧ rr)) = {iv ∧ rr, told(R, I,iv ∧ rr)}). Note
that rule 2 from Fig. 2 is applied and that the communication fact told(R, I,iv ∧ rr) does
not remain in the set of brute facts.
The following example shows that any cancellation of a commitment before its dead-
line may cause the violation of the commitment and therefore the application of regulation
policies.
Example 14 (Agents’ communication continues) Suppose now the Insurer agent I cancels
its commitment made towards the Repairer agent R to approve assessment. Assume that we
have the following regulation policy indicating that a violation due to a cancellation requires
the Insurer agent to pay ¤200 to the Repairer agent, i.e.,
Cvc(I,R,iv ∧ rr,aa,d,d+4) ⇒r pay(I, R, ¤ 200) in c10
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The application of the left transition rule due to this communication causes the following
state transition to be derived.
〈{ d1, iv ∧ rr}, {Cd(I,R,iv ∧ rr,aa,d,d+4)}〉
cancel(I,R,aa)−−−−−−−−→
〈{ d1, iv ∧ rr, pay(I, R, ¤ 200)},∅〉
This transition takes place by again applying the transition rule for events (Definition 11)
due to the cancel action (assuming that the effect of the cancel action is to cause the
action proposition cancelled to hold, i.e., effect(cancel(I,R,aa)) = {cancelled(I,R,aa)}).
Note that rule 5 from Fig. 2 is applied. The application of this norm changes the com-
mitment state from conditional to cancellation violation, i.e., it replaces the commitment
Cc(I,R,iv ∧ rr,aa,d,d+4) to the commitment Cvc(I,R,iv ∧ rr,aa,d,d+4). More-
over, the subsequent application of the policy adds the brute fact pay(I, R, ¤ 200) to
the set of brute facts and removes the commitment Cvc(I,R,iv∧rr,aa,d,d+4) from the
set of institutional facts.
3.3 Organisation execution
We are now ready to define the executions of an organisation. Recall that an organisation
monitors the interaction among agents as well as the interaction between agents and the envi-
ronment to detect norm violations and enforces norms by means of regulation policies when
violations are detected. In our framework, the transition rules, presented in Definition 11,
are responsible for monitor and regulation processes. The executions of an organisation,
called computational runs, are determined by the transition system which is specified by the
transition rules.
Definition 12 (Computational runs) Given the transition rules as presented in Definition 11
and an initial state of an organisation O0 = 〈σb, σi 〉, a computational run of the organisation
CR(O0) is an infinite sequence O0, α0,O1, α1,O2, α2, . . . where ∀i≥0 : Oi αi−→ Oi+1 is a
transition derivable by applying a transition rule and αi is an event occurring in state Oi .
Possible computational runs of an organisation are due to possible sequences of occurred
events (i.e., agents’ actions or changes in the environment). In other words, the interactions
between agents and between agents and the environment determine the computational runs
of an organisation.
Proposition 4 Let O0, α0,O1, α1,O2, α2, . . . be a computational run of an organisation.
We have that On is an organisation state for n ≥ 0, i.e., ∀n ≥ 0 : On = 〈σ nb , σ ni 〉 with
σ nb ⊆ Πb, σ ni ⊆ Πi .
Proof By induction. The initial state O0 = 〈σ 0b , σ 0i 〉 is an organisation state, i.e., σ 0b ⊆ Πb
andσ 0i ⊆ Πi . SupposeOk = 〈σ kb , σ ki 〉 is anorganisation state for k ≥ 0. Proposition1 ensures
that Ok = 〈σ kb , σ ki 〉
αk−→ 〈σ k+1b , σ k+1i 〉 = Ok+1 is an organisation state, i.e., σ k+1b ⊆ Πb,
σ k+1i ⊆ Πi , and σ k+1b and σ k+1i are finite. unionsq
We give some example execution traces corresponding to agent actions in the insurance
scenario. The context used in the traces is the combined context of Figs. 2, 3, and 4. Specific
predicates correspond to agent actions in the scenario, such as insurance-validated.
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Trace 1 Agent actions aremanifest in communication actions, and in the impact of the actions
upon the commitments in the institutional state. The trace in Table 1 begins with the offers
that create the five commitments. Column Rule gives the Counts-as Rule in the notation X.Y
for rule Y of Figure X . We abbreviate the logical propositions by their initials, e.g., pp for
premium-paid, and we do not show deadlines.
Once the commitments are established, in step 8, the customer proves payment of the
insurance. In steps 10 and 11, she reports car damage. In step 15, the garage has completed
the repair. In step 19 the garage receives confirmation of the approval and in step 20 it tells
the customer the car is ready, within the 10 days promised to the customer. Payment to the
garage by the insurer concludes the scenario.
Trace 2 Table 2 takes the same scenario but supposes that the assessor is delayed in his work.
According to commitment C3, the Assessor commits to having the assessment done no later
than two days after the Repairer informs the Assessor of a report of a damaged car and a
validated insurance on that car. The Assessor does not complete the assessment for 4 days
after it began. This means the deadline on C3 is violated (step 13). The Assessor is motivated
to inform the Insurer of completion of the assessment, because otherwise he will not be paid
by the Insurer for his work. We suppose (as in Table 1) that the Assessor informs the Insurer
the same day that he completes the assessment. It takes the Insurer up to 4 days to approve the
assessment (C1b) and thus the Repairer does not receive confirmation that the assessment is
approved until day 21. This means that, although the Repairer has completed the repair work
on the car, it cannot release the car to the Customer until day 22. This violates its deadline
on C4, which was due by day 20.
We suppose a penalty clause in the insurance contract, whereby the Insurer guarantees that
properly-reported eligible car damage will be repaired within 10 days. One could model the
guarantee by an additional commitment from Insurer to Customer (not shown); the deadline
on the consequent in C4 derives from this. As we have it the guarantee is modelled in C4 and
the following regulative rule:
Cvt4 ⇒r pay(Insurer, Customer, ¤ 200)
which is applied for any delay beyond the deadline. This rule models the penalty clause upon
the Insurer which states that the Insurer will compensate the Customer for delayed repairs
by the amount of 200 euro. Thus, according to this rule in step 21, payment is made by the
Insurer to the Customer.
4 Logical analysis of interaction protocols
Many different kinds of norms and regulation policies can not only be defined in our formal
framework, but also be compared and analysed. As we allow the user of our formal frame-
work to define her own set of norms and regulations, and small changes in these norms and
regulations may have a big effect on the system’s behaviour, it is important to also provide
formal methods to analyse the behaviour of the system. In this section we show how to
analyse a normative system by proving various properties, and we illustrate these properties
on the three contexts defined in the previous sections. Note the difference with the properties
we defined in the previous section: thus far, all properties held for all normative systems, as
they were properties of our operational semantics. The properties discussed in this section
hold only for a particular normative system.
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More precisely, the properties in this section assume, besidesDefinitions 1–12, alsoAction
Set 1, contexts c = {c1, c2, c3}, the set of commitment states S occurring in these contexts
of c, App and sX as defined in Example 9, and moreover the following two reasonable
constraints on the update function and the regulation policy:
– The update function⊗ in Definition 11 is based on the fact that only one communication
proposition is true at a time, and
– Only vc and vt commitments occur in the antecedents of a regulation policy in Defini-
tion 6.
In the first item, the fact that only one communication proposition is true at a time together
with the fact that only bidirectional communication is considered so far may suggest that our
framework is restricted to one bidirectional communication at a time, and that our framework
cannotmodel simultaneous communication betweenmultiple agentswith possibly interfering
effects. However, this is not the case as our framework can model such cases by assuming
concurrent (communication) actions in the transition rules as proposed in Definition 11,
i.e., by assuming α to be a concurrent (communication) action. Of course, it should also be
assumed that the effect function provides the brute effect of simultaneous communication
actions with their interfering effects. In the rest of the article, we will not discuss this issue
in detail as this is not the focus of our work.
4.1 Temporal properties
We start with temporal properties describing the dynamics of the commitment states. These
properties illustrate that the commitment states follow the commitment lifecycle in Fig. 1.
Together they imply continuity properties about reaching termination states. Consequently,
a conditional and detached commitment state will lead to precisely one termination state.
First, each commitment is in at most one state.
Proposition 5 (Uniqueness) For all computational runs O0, α0,O1, α1 . . . and all x =
y, and all φx , φy, δy, δx , we have at each state Ok = 〈σb, σi 〉 that σi contains at
most one of: Cc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ), Cd(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ), Cs(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ),
Cvc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ), Cvt (x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ), Ce(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ), and [4]
Ct (x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ).
Proof By induction over the sequence of states in a computational run. The induction predi-
cate P(k) is that at stateOk , at most one of the given commitments is in the institutional facts
σi . Base condition. Initially, the set of commitments is empty. Thus P(0) holds. Induction
step. Assume P(k), the induction predicate holds at state Ok . Given the constraint on the
update function ⊗, at most one of the speech act or action propositions Πa is in the updated
brute facts σ ∗b = ⊗(σb, effect(α)). Consequently, given that x is unequal to y, at most one
counts-as rule in context {c1, c2, c4} is applicable (as can directly be verified by the rules in
Figs. 2, 3, 4). Given that at new state σ ′i of the computational run, the old commitments are
removed, at moment k + 1, at most one of the commitments is in the institutional facts σi .
Thus P(k + 1) holds. By induction principle, the induction predicate holds at each moment
of the computational run. unionsq
Although it may seem obvious that a commitment can be in one state only, it may easily
occur that a less careful representation of the counts-as rules leads to a state in which two
commitments are derived from one. Even with the given rules in context {c1, c2, c4}, this
may happen when we replace App as defined in Example 9 by the one in Example 10,
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where we may apply rules iteratively. To see this, let Ok = 〈σ kb , σ ki 〉 and consider the
case of an offer, of which the deadline is already true: αk = offer(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ),
and σ kb ∪ σ ki | ¬φy ∧ δy . Then we derive two commitments Cc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) and
Ct (x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ). In other words, if we want to use the App from Example 10, and we
want to have the uniqueness property of commitments, we need to change the count-as rules.
In the rest of this section, we write Ok | φ as an abbreviation of σ kb ∪ σ ki | φ.
Besides the assumptions made above, the remaining properties in this section are based
in addition on the following assumption of non-repetition.
Definition 13 (Non-repetition) A computational run O0, α0,O1, α1 . . . satisfies the non-
repetition property if and only if there are no two actions αk and αl for k = l in the
computational run that are the same offer αk = αl = offer(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ).
In particular, if all offers of the computational run have a unique identifier as part of
φx and φy , then the non-repetition property is satisfied. Thus, if we assume that each
offer(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) is done with unique φy and φx , then there is no repetition.
Second, after the temporal properties, we state continuity properties about some of the
termination states: once they are true, they will stay true. This does not hold for the violation
states, as the violation will be removed once the sanction is applied (i.e., once the regulation
policy is implemented).
Proposition 6 For all computational runs O0, α0,O1, α1 . . ., which satisfy the non-
repetition property, if Cs(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ), Ce(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ), or
Ct (x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) is in σi of state Ok = 〈σb, σi 〉, then it is also in σ ′i of state
Ol = 〈σ ′b, σ ′i 〉 for k < l. Moreover, if the set of regulation policies is empty, then the
same property holds also for Cvc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) and Cvt (x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ).
Proof Suppose that one of Cs(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ), Ce(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ), or
Ct (x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) is in σi of state Ok = 〈σb, σi 〉. Then we have that
αl = offer(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) for some l < k. Consequently, due to the non-repetition
property in Definition 13, we have ∀ l > k, αl = offer(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ). In addition, due
to the fact that a commitment can only be in one state at the time, i.e., Proposition 5, we have
that none of the counts-as rules in context {c1, c2, c4} is applicable (as can directly be veri-
fied by the rules in Figs. 2, 3, 4). Thus Cs(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ), Ce(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ), or
Ct (x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) is also in σ ′i of stateOl = 〈σ ′b, σ ′i 〉 for k < l. The same argument goes
through for
Cvc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) and Cvt (x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) provided there are no regulation poli-
cies. unionsq
Third, we give continuity properties about conditional and detached commitments: they
hold until they are fulfilled or the deadline is reached. We use the weak until U operator of
linear time logic (LTL) to express the properties compactly: φ holds until ψ if and only if φ
is true until the first position in which ψ is true (or forever if such a position does not exist).
Proposition 7 We say that a property φUψ holds at state Ok in computational run
CR(O0) = O0, α0,O1, α1 . . ., written as CR(O0),Ok | φUψ , if and only if for all posi-
tions j ≥ k we have
– if for all i such that k ≤ i ≤ j we have Oi | ψ , then O j | φ.
If the computational run is clear from context, as below, we also write Ok | φUψ for
CR(O0),Ok | φUψ .
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The following properties hold at state Ok = 〈σ kb , σ ki 〉 of a computational run satisfying
the non-repetition property:
– If αk = offer(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ), then
Ok+1 | Cc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx )U(Cd(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx )∨
Ce(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) ∨ Cs(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) ∨ Ct (x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx )).
– If αk = tell(y, x, φy) or αk is an action, and Ok | Cc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) and σ k∗b =
⊗(σ kb , effect(αk)) | ¬δy ∧ φy and is consistent, then
Ok+1 | Cd(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx )U(Cvc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx )∨
Cs(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) ∨ Ct (x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx )).
Proof – Assume αk = offer(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ). Due to the first counts-as rule, and the
assumption that σ ∗b = ⊗(σ kb , effect(αk)) is consistent for communication acts, we have
Cc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) in σ
k+1
i for σ
k+1
i of state Ok+1 = 〈σ k+1b , σ k+1i 〉. In addition,
due to the fact that a commitment can only be in one state at the time, i.e., Propo-
sition 5, we have that at most one of the counts-as rules in context {c1, c2, c4} is
applicable (as can directly be verified by the rules in Figs. 2, 3, 4), and these rules
lead to Cd(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) or Ce(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) or Cs(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) or
Ct (x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ).
– Assume αk = tell( j, i, φy) or αk is an action, assume Ok | Cc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx )
and assume that σ k∗b = ⊗(σ kb , effect(αk)) | ¬δy ∧ φy and is consistent. Due to the
second counts-as rule in context c1, or the first rule in context c2, and the second and
third condition of the property, we have Cd(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) in σ
k+1
i for σ
k+1
i of
state Ok+1 = 〈σ k+1b , σ k+1i 〉. Again, due to the fact that a commitment can only be in
one state at the time, i.e., Proposition 5, we have that at most one of the counts-as rules
in context {c1, c2, c4} is applicable (as can directly be verified by the rules in Figs. 2, 3,
4). These rules lead to one of Cvc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) or Cs(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) or
Ct (x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ).
unionsq
If we change the temporal properties or the rules, then also the properties of the operational
semantics will change. For example, if we adopt context where a conditional commitment
cannot be directly satisfied without going through a detached state, we have the following
variant:
– If αk = offer(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ), then
Ok+1 | Cc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx )U(Cd(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx )∨
Ce(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) ∨ Ct (x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx )).
Further temporal properties can be defined to illustrate that the operational semantics
behaves according to the commitment lifecycle in Fig. 1. For example, we may wonder
whether we have that a deadline succeeds in removing commitments. As above, this depends
on the precise specification of the counts-as rules. Here we have to be careful about the
borderline conditions. For example, consider an offer, of which the deadline is already true.
For such an offer, we may check whether the commitment is created at the next moment:
– If αk = offer(x, y, φy, φx ,,), then Ok+1 | Cc(x, y, φy, φx ,,)
or whether the commitment is terminated:
– If αk = offer(x, y, φy, φx ,,), then Ok+1 | Ct (x, y, φy, φx ,,)
Likewise, we might check that no commitment holds when the deadline is true:
– Ok | δy → ¬Cc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx )
– Ok | δx → ¬Cd(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx )
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4.2 Interference
In this subsection we consider whether one commitment lifecycle can affect another one;
we call this interference. The first proposition shows that one action can lead to moves in
multiple commitment lifecycles.
Proposition 8 If the organisation updates the institutional facts based on a performed com-
munication action tell(y, x, p) or an action done(p), then it can detach or satisfy multiple
commitments at once.
Proof Consider the following example. Assume the organisation updates the institutional
facts based on the following four actions, where s(x,y) stands for one service of y to x , t(x,y)
for another one, and p(y,20) stands for paying twenty euro. offer(x, y, s(x,y), p(y,20), t2, t5),
offer(x, y, t(x,y), p(y,20), t2, t5), done(s(b,i)), and done(t(b,i)). This leads to two detached
commitments, Cd(x, y, s(x,y), p(y,20), t2, t5) and Cd(x, y, t(x,y), p(y,20), t2, t5). Performing
action done(p(y,20)) will now move both detached commitments to satisfied commitments,
i.e., agent x de-commits itself by paying ¤20 instead of ¤40. unionsq
Example 15 Another similar example is when an agent makes two offers that differ only in
the deadlines. In that case, the commitment with the earlier deadline ‘subsumes’ the one with
the later deadline.
These examples illustrates that the agents must be careful to distinguish propositions.
In this case, the agents should syntactically distinguish p(y,20) referring to pay ¤20 in
offer(x, y, s(x,y), p(y,20), t2, t5) and offer(x, y, t(x,y), p(y,20), t2, t5) respectively, and it is left
to the agent to prevent this undesired interference.
The second proposition shows that there may be two commitments which can be satisfied
individually, but not together. At first sight it may seem that this can be done simply by
commitments for p and for ¬p, but these two commitments can be satisfied consecutively.
Proposition 9 There may be commitments which can be satisfied individually, but not
together.
Proof Consider the following example. If you offer to do p before deadline q and you offer
to do q before deadline p, we have a contradiction (with the interpretation of deadline as in
context c3). unionsq
We may define interference in terms of independence of commitment lifecycles: two
commitment lifecycles are independent if any kind of interleaving of the two lifecycles leads
to the same final state. We leave the formalisation of these notions to further research.
4.3 Redundancy
Broersen and van der Torre [8] define norms to be redundant if their removal from the
normative system does not change the set of detached institutional facts. In the current article,
the commitments correspond to these institutional facts. They distinguish various kinds of
redundancy properties depending on various kinds of equivalence among computational runs.
In this subsection, we consider redundancy properties that do not change the brute facts. We
confine ourselves to the following regulation policy, where agents are blacklisted once they
violated a commitment, i.e., which treats all violations in the same way.
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Definition 14 (Blacklisting regulation policy) A blacklisting regulation policy is a regulation
policy consisting of all instances of the following two policies:
Cvt (x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) ⇒r addx,BL
Cvc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) ⇒r addx,BL
In the followingwe define a partial run as an initial segment of a computational run.We say
that an offer is blacklist redundant in a partial run if the computational run without the offer
and the computational run with the offer lead to the same brute facts in the computational
run. This implies that the two computational runs have violations in the same states.
Definition 15 A partial run is a finite sequence O0, α0,O1, α1 . . . ,On where Oi is a multi-
agent organisation state, αi is the action performed in state Oi , and ∀i≥0 : Oi αi−→ Oi+1 is a
transition derived by applying the given transition rules.
An offer α is blacklist redundant in a partial run if and only if for all computational runs
extending the partial run, O0, α0,O1, α1 . . . ,On, αn,On+1, . . ., we have that the computa-
tional run O0, α0,O1, α1 . . . ,On, α, c, αn,O′n+1, . . . is such that σ bk = σ bk ′ for all k > n,
where Ok = (σ bk , σ ik ) and O′k = (σ bk ′, σ ik ′).
The following proposition gives, given a partial run, some offers that are blacklist redun-
dant. The properties are very natural andmay be taken as requirements on a normative system.
They all say, in some way, that it is redundant to offer less than what you already offered
in the past. The fourth property has a more technical nature as it considers actions to make
a deadline true, but such mixtures of actions and deadlines give important insights in the
working of the normative system.
Proposition 10 If the following conditions hold:
– R contains blacklisting regulation policy, and does not contain any other rules than the
blacklisting regulation policy,
– ⊗(σb, effect(α)) \ Πact = σb for communication actions α, i.e., communication actions
do not have side effects, and
– The update function ⊗ is successful in the sense that the update with the regulation
policy ⊗(σ ∗b \ Πact , cons(App(σ ∗b ∪ σ ∗i , R, c))) contains conclusions cons(App(σ ∗b ∪
σ ∗i , R, c)), and
– The update function⊗ is blacklist persistent in the sense that once an agent is blacklisted,
it will remain blacklisted,
Then the following properties hold:
– If On | Cc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ), then offer(x, y, φy ∧ ψ, φx , δy, δx ) is blacklist redun-
dant in O0, α0,O1, α1 . . . ,On. In other words, if x has offered y that if y does φy before
δy , then x will do φx before δx , then it is redundant for x to offer y that if y does φy ∧ ψ
then x will do φx , under the same deadlines.
– If On | Cc(x, y, φy, φx ∧ ψ, δy, δx ), then offer(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) is blacklist redun-
dant in O0, α0,O1, α1 . . . ,On. In other words, if x has offered y that if y does φy before
δy , then x will do φx ∧ ψ before δx , then it is redundant for x to offer y that if y does φy
then x will do φx , under the same deadlines.
– If On | Cc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) and On | Cc(x, y, ψy, φx , δy, δx ), then
offer(x, y, φy ∨ψy, φx , δy, δx ) is blacklist redundant in O0, α0,O1, α1 . . . ,On. In other
words, if x has offered y that if y does φy before δy , then x will do φx before δx , and
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x has offered y that if y does ψy , then x will do φx under the same deadlines, then it
is redundant for x to offer y that if y does φy ∨ ψy then x will do φx , under the same
deadlines.
– If On | Cc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ) and On | Cc(x, y, φy, δx , δy, δ′x ), then
offer(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δ′x ) is blacklist redundant in O0, α0,O1, α1 . . . ,On. In other
words, if x has offered y that if y does φy before δy , then x will do φx before δx , and x
has offered y that if y does φy before the same deadline, then x will do δx before δ′x , then
it is redundant for x to offer y that if y does φy then x will do φx before δ′x .
Proof – Assume a partial run O0, α0,O1, α1 . . . ,On s.t. On | Cc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ),
and α = offer(x, y, φy ∧ ψ, φx , δy, δx ). If On = 〈σb, σi 〉, then On+1 = 〈σb, σi ∪
Cc(x, y, φy ∧ ψ, φx , δy, δx )〉 due to the constraint on the update function. Now due to
the occurrence of φx in both commitments, and the fact that we can satisfy a commitment
even if it is not detached yet, if the first is satisfied the second is too. Moreover, if the
second one is violated, the first one is violated too. The result follows.
– Assume O0, α0,O1, α1 . . . ,On such that On | Cc(x, y, φy, φx ∧ ψ, δy, δx ), and α =
offer(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ). If On = 〈σb, σi 〉, then, due to the constraint on the update
function, On+1 = 〈σb, σi ∪ Cc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx )〉. Now if the first is satisfied the
second is too. Moreover, due to the occurrence of φy in both commitments, if the second
one is violated, the first one is violated too. The result follows.
– Assume a partial run O0, α0,O1, α1 . . . ,On s.t. On | Cc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ), On |
Cc(x, y, ψy, φx , δy, δx ) and α = offer(x, y, φy ∨ψy, φx , δy, δx ). If On = 〈σb, σi 〉, then
On+1 = 〈σb, σi ∪ Cc(x, y, φy ∨ ψy, φx , δy, δx )〉 due to the constraint on the update
function. Now due to the occurrence of φx in both commitments, and the fact that we
can satisfy a commitment even if it is not detached yet, if the first ones are satisfied the
third one is too. Moreover, if the third one is detached, one of the first two is detached
too. And finally, if the third one is violated, then one of the first two is violated too. The
result follows.
– Assume a partial run O0, α0,O1, α1 . . . ,On s.t. On | Cc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δx ), On |
Cc(x, y, φy, δx , δy, δ′x ) and α = offer(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δ′x ). If On = 〈σb, σi 〉, then
On+1 = 〈σb, σi ∪ Cc(x, y, φy, φx , δy, δ′x )〉 due to the constraint on the update func-
tion. Now due to the temporal sequence in the commitments, and the fact that we can
satisfy a commitment even if it is not detached yet, if the first ones are satisfied the third
one is too. Moreover, if the third one is detached, the first two are detached too. And
finally, if the third one is violated, then one of the first two is violated too. The result
follows.
unionsq
The following proposition shows an offer which may seem blacklist redundant at first
sight, but that is not blacklist redundant under our present assumptions.
Proposition 11 If Cc(x, y, p, q, d1, d2) ∧ Cc(x, y, p, r, d1, d2), then offer(x, y, p, q ∧
r, d1, d2) is not necessarily blacklist redundant. If x has offered y that if y does p then
x will do q, and if y does p, then x will do r , then it is not redundant to offer y that x will do
q ∧ r , under the same conditions.
Proof (Sketch) Since q and r may be true at different timepoints, the commitment for q ∧ r
cannot be derived from it. unionsq
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5 Norms for alternative commitment lifecycles
In this section we discuss some possible sets of norms that specify different commitment
lifecycles.Our objective in particular is to showhowourmethodology is not tied to a particular
view of commitments, but can accommodate alternative views.We leave detailed application
of our methodology to alternative norm sets for the future.
5.1 Truthfulness of communication
The norms in Fig. 2 require truthfulness of the communication actions. This requirement is
encoded by including the proposition that is involved in the speech act in the antecedent of
the counts-as rules. For example, the second norm, rule 2, changes the state of a commitment
from conditional to detached when an agent y has told agent x that φy is true and moreover
φy is true (we ignore the deadline proposition). The inclusion of both communication actions
and factual statements check whether the communication actions are performed truthfully.
If we do not include this check, then we have instead the norms in Fig. 5.
The norms of Fig. 5 are appropriate in situationswhere agents trust other agents sufficiently
to believe what others tell them, and in situations where agents are not able to check the
veracity of what they are told. By contrast, the norms of Fig. 2 are more appropriate in
situations where agents do not ‘blindly’ trust other agents.
5.2 Deadlines
As explained in Sect. 3.1.1, a commitment may change its state from detached to violated
if the environment make a transition (time elapses) through which the deadline (a brute
fact) becomes true. Figure 6 lists alternative examples of norms that govern the dynamics of
commitments due to the internal mechanism of the environment. The difference with context
c3 is the borderline case where the actions is satisfied precisely at the deadline.
– The elapse of deadline δx counts as the violation of a detached commitment. The appli-
cation of this rule 1 in Fig. 6 removes the detached commitment from institutional facts
and adds a corresponding violated commitment to it.
1 offered(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ⇒n Cc(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c4
2 told(y, x, φy) ∧ Cc(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ ¬δy ⇒n Cd(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c4
3 told(x, y, φx) ∧ Cc(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ ¬δy ⇒n Cs(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c4
4 told(x, y, φx) ∧ Cd(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ ¬δx ⇒n Cs(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c4
5 cancelled(x, y, φx) ∧ Cd(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ ¬δx ⇒n Cvc(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c4
6 failed(y, x, φy) ∧ Cc(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ ¬δy ⇒n Ce(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c4
7 cancelled(x, y, φx) ∧ Cc(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ ¬δy ⇒n Ct(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c4
8 released(y, x, φy) ∧ Cd(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ ¬δx ⇒n Ct(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c4
Fig. 5 Example context 4 (c4). Norms based on communication actions without factual check
1 Cd(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ δx ∧ ¬φx =⇒n Cvt(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c5
2 Cc(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ δy ∧ ¬φy =⇒n Ce(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c5
Fig. 6 Example context 5 (c5). Counts-as rules specify the lifecycle of commitments based on environment
events. Commitments can be fulfilled before or at the deadline
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1 offered(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ⇒n Cp(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c6
2 accepted(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ Cp(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ ¬φx ⇒n Cc(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) in c6
3 Cx(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) ∧ φx ⇒n Cs(x, y, φy , φx, δy , δx) for x ∈ {p, c, d} in c6
Fig. 7 Example context 6 (c6). Counts-as rules specify the lifecycle of commitments based on communication
actions
– The elapse of deadline δy counts as expiration of a conditional commitment. The applica-
tion of this rule 2 in Fig. 6 removes the conditional commitment from institutional facts
and adds a corresponding expired commitment to it.
5.3 Explicit acceptance of commitments
Recall that the commitment lifecycle given in Sect. 2.2 follows that of Singh [62,65], in
which commitments are unilateral, not requiring acceptance by the other party (but therefore
not binding upon them).
The rules inSect. 3.1.1, given inFigs. 2 and3, thusmodel the specific commitment lifecycle
as presented in Fig. 1. Different rules can be proposed for alternative lifecycles. For example,
following Castelfranchi [21], one can require that conditional commitments are created only
after explicit acceptance by the creditor. Or, if the content of what is committed by a debtor
is satisfied before the commitment is accepted by the creditor or before it is detached for the
debtor, or after its detachment, then the commitment will be considered as satisfied.
These alternative rules are presented in Fig. 7. In particular, rule 1 indicates that the
proposed commitments are represented byCp). Rule 2 indicates that a proposed commitment
becomes a conditional commitment after explicit acceptance by the creditor. Finally, rule 3
in Fig. 7 indicates that a proposed, conditional, and detached commitment is considered as
being satisfied when the debtor’s commitment is satisfied.
5.4 Further topics
There are many other ways in which the commitment lifecycles can be changed or extended.
We mention two of such changes here, but we do not present the counts-as rules.
First, in our operational semantics for commitments, we declare that a commitment is
satisfied if its consequent is true, irrespective of whether the antecedent has been made true
yet or not. This is expressed in rule 1 in Fig. 2. A different semantics for commitments would
say that a commitment is satisfied only if its antecedent is made true and then its consequent
is made true. A modification of rules 3 and 4 in Fig. 2 can express this. Specifically, we can
simply remove rule 3.
Second, commitments as modelled in this article consider achievement, whereas we can
also define rules for persistence. For example, if x commits that p will not hold until deadline
d , thenwehave the following. First, if the deadline is achieved, then the prohibition is satisfied.
Second, if d is false at some moment before the deadline, then the commitment is violated.
We can define this in our framework by defining other constitutive rules.
For example, let d0 be the start of the year and d1 be the end of the year. The Insurer will
increase the no-claims bonus of the Owner, if the latter does not submit an insurance claim
that year. We have a rule such as:
〈{ d0 }, {Cc(I,O,¬insurance-claim,increase-no-claims-bonus,d0,d1)}〉
d0→d1−−−−→
〈{ d1 }, {Cd(I,O,¬insurance-claim,increase-no-claims-bonus,d0,d1)}〉
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6 Related work and discussion
Billhardt et al. [7] summarize agreement technologies as comprising of two main elements:
“(1) a normative context, that determines the rules of the game…and (2) a call-by-agreement
interaction method, where an agreement for action between the agents that respects the
normative context is established first; then actual enactment of the action is requested.” Our
work speaks to both elements, through our emphasis of the normative organisational context,
on the one hand, founded on social commitments, on the other.
Social commitments are now well established in the literature, and various lifecycles for
commitments have been proposed (e.g., [42,51,52]). The relation between communication
and commitments has been examined from several perspectives. Among the first to study
commitments andAgentCommunicationLanguages (ACLs)were Singh [62] andColombetti
[27]. Singh, for example, develops a formal logical semantics for an ACL based on com-
munication actions interpreted in terms of commitments, using Computation Tree Logic. de
Boer et al. [35] were also among the first to define an operational semantics for an ACL, and
in the same year, McBurney et al. did so for an agent interaction protocol [53].
The idea of non-communicative actions and the enforcement of sanctions by monitoring
the state of commitments became common in the agents literature. The schema of our model
is standard when dealing with commitments in agents organisations: organisations consist of
facts, norms, commitments and sanction, the agents can perform a set of actions which lead
to the creation of commitments, and these commitments have rules in form of count-as rules
andwhen the commitments are violated, sanctions apply [4,9,20,24,25,42,43,49,51,52,55].
Moreover, as with our work, formalisations are often based on a lifecycle for commit-
ments using an operational semantics. However, the aim is typically to give a semantics
for a large variety of communication actions, e.g. for propose or request, and such works
therefore have to define their semantics in considerable detail. Further still, the trend is to
make the languages ever more expressive but hence complex, for example by introducing
higher order commitments [61], meta-commitments [68], embedded temporal regulations
[4], organisational goals, other norms besides those commitment-based norms, and so on.
Building on earlier work [27,42], Fornara et al. [43] propose an ACL based on communi-
cation actions seen as instrumental actions, i.e., actions that modify reality such as changing
the physical environment, when bound to institutional actions, i.e., actions that change insti-
tutional attributes. They define norms as “rules that manipulate commitments of the agents
engaged in an interaction” and thus, unlike our work, define norms as event-driven rules and
provide a more limited operational semantics. In this and earlier work (e.g., [42]), Fornara
and colleagues adopt a state-based definition of commitments that includes an unset state (to
express directive communicative acts like requests). They allow temporal propositions in the
content of a commitment, but have a timeout only for commitments in unset state.
Flores et al. [41] propose an ACL founded on four levels: compositional, conversational,
commitment state, and joint activity. Like Fornara et al., these authors definemessage seman-
tics (at one level) based on commitments. They require explicit acceptance of a commitment
by the creditor (or debtor). Our focus by contrast is on communication and sanction within
an operationalizable organisational setting.
In contrast to these and similar works, Kibble [49] critiques ACLs founded on speech acts,
preferring an extension of commitment-based protocols [4] incorporating Brandom’s notions
of commitment, entitlement, and perspectival commitment stores. He considers both ‘active’
acceptance (e.g., of a request) and ‘passive’ acceptance (by silence). Similarly, Boella et al.
[9] contrast ACLs based on (private) mental attitudes (e.g., BDI models) such as the FIPA
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standard [40], and ACLs based on social commitments, arguing that the latter solve many but
not all of the problems identified with the former. The authors suggest a role-based ontology
of public mental attitudes that distinguishes action commitments and propositions.
It is not for us to enter in this article the debate in the commitments literature whether
or not explicit acceptance should be part of the construct.3 Following Singh and colleagues
(e.g., Chopra and Singh [25]), the commitment lifecycle in Sect. 2.2 does not require explicit
acceptance. In contrast to the above works, our stated purpose is not to define an ACL
but to establish how norms are to be operationalized in an organisational setting. As we
demonstrated in Sect. 5, our methodology can be applied for alternative sets of communi-
cation actions than those selected in Sect. 3.1.1 and following, and for alternative sets of
commitment-based norms.
Singh [61] is an example of commitment management within an organisational structure,
bymeansof social policies defined as higher-order commitments.Going further,Venkatraman
and Singh [68] define metacommitments as first-order commitments, and use them to define
protocols in which messages between agents correspond to operations on commitments.
They verify adherence to these commitment-based protocol using temporal logic. While
metacommitments can be seen as a type of norm, the authors do not consider sanctions for
violated protocols.
Baldoni et al. [4] extend earlier work on commitment-based protocols by distinguishing
constitutive rules which define the meaning of actions and regulative rules which define
the flow of execution. Despite giving a language for representing regulative rules based on
constraints among commitments, the authors do not consider norms and sanctions.
Formal verification of commitments is exemplified by ElMenshawy et al. [37], who define
a temporal logic and use symbolic model checking. Such formal model-checking approaches
have been applied to (pre-defined) commitment-based protocols. Günay et al. [46] propose
an algorithm for agents to generate novel protocols at runtime.
Chesani et al. [22,23] were perhaps the first to address commitment monitoring through
a formal yet operational approach. They define a declarative, practical language for commit-
ments, and exhibit a proof approach with the reactive event calculus. Notably, their language
includes deadlines, and compensation actions for events such as for deadline violation. They
treat metric time and commitments with data parameters, which we do not. Our work takes
the approach of a rule-based semantics rather than a logic programming-based event calculus
approach, and provides a methodology that applies to different commitment lifecycles.
Knobbout and Dastani [50] consider norms as directed to coalitions of agents and provide
a logic to reason about the impact of such norms on the overall multi-agent system behaviours
under various norm compliance assumptions. In this paper, a norm states that a set of agents
should not take certain actions in specific states. The authors introduce different types of norm
compliance behaviours such as a coalition of agents obey/violate norms that are directed to
precisely this coalition or a it and all its subcoalitions. The proposed logic can be used to
reason if a coalition of agents can achieve their own objectives by behaving according to
a specific norm compliance type when the system is populated by other agents that behave
according to another specific norm compliance type.
Bulling and Dastani [19] approach norms from amechanism design perspective and focus
on whether the enforcement of a specific set of norms bymeans of sanctions can influence the
behaviour of agents and align them with the objectives of the system designer. The authors
assume that the agents are rational in the sense that they behave according to their own
3 We are grateful for a reviewer pointing out that most legal jurisdictions construe commitments as arising
only when accepted by someone, not when first uttered: see [57].
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preferences. In this paper, norms and preferences are represented as LTL formulae, and the
agents behaviours are studied from a game theoretic perspective. The proposed framework
can be used to determine whether a set of norms with their corresponding sanctions can
implement the objectives of the system designer, defined as social choice function, in Nash
equilibria. The framework can also be used to synthesize norms and sanctions such that their
enforcement implement the objectives of the system designer in Nash equilibria.
Compared to earlier work, our approach differs in the following regards. First, we use
counts-as rules explicitly as technical constructs while Fornara et al. [42], for instance, treat
counts-as relation primarily as linguistic conventions. Note that counts-as rules in our work
can be seen as defeasible rules. Second, we provide an operational semantics for interactions
(amongwhich communication actions)within an organisational setting. Fornara et al. provide
semi-formal specification of organisations and consider only communication actions. Further,
we analyze the properties of interaction within an organisational setting. Third, we consider
the effect of non-communicative actions as well as the elapse of deadlines. Fourth we have
sanction rules while earlier works leave open the question of what should happens when
commitments are violated. Fifth, in contrast to someworks,we adopt a contemporary lifecycle
of commitments, following Chopra and Singh [25] and precedents (see earlier discussion in
this section).
These last authors are interested in simplifying the specification of commitment-based
protocols or requirements. Our aim is in linewith the latter paper [25], and the two approaches
are orthogonal. Chopra and Singh capture business requirements with commitment-based
specifications, and then group these specifications into reusable methods. They consider
protocol enactment but not the organisational setting, which is our focus. By contrast, we do
not aim to directly model business requirements, but start from the lifecycle of commitments
and define a minimal language to make all possible changes to the commitment base.
An alternative approach that aims for the same level of genericity as we pursue, is the
approach of using deontic-inspired specifications which are monitored and enforced. An
example of this kind of approach is the work of Felipe et al. [39]. A discussion for the future
is to compare our commitment-based approach versus a deontic-inspired approach.
In earlier work, Singh examinedwhen a commitmentmay be considered satisfied but some
change or event can lead to checkingwhether it is still valid, and transitioning the commitment
to a new state based on whether it is valid or not [71]. Instead, we model violation in terms
of regulative rules, which are separate from the rules modelling the commitment lifecycle.
Pasquier and Chaib-draa [55] study the link between communication based on social
commitments, and the internal intentions of the agents involved. Similarly, Winikoff [70]
develops a mapping from commitments to BDI-style plans. Concerned with operationalizing
inter-agent interaction, these latter works do not consider institutional aspects.
Alechina et al. [1] are among those who ask how norm-aware agents can be implemented.
They provide a norm-aware agent programming language that allows agents to deliberate on
their goals, norms and sanctions before deciding which plan to select and execute.
Carabelea and Boissier [20] do consider an organisational setting and model expected
behaviour of agents playing specified roles using commitments. They posit an “Institutional
Agent” that rewards or sanctions agents that fulfil or deviate from specified behaviour. They
do not consider communication actions, nor present an operational semantics.
Marengo et al. [52] develop a formal semantics of commitments with embedded temporal
regulations, and study important notions of control and safety. They argue that their frame-
work accommodates both constitutive and regulative norms “grounded in communication”.
In their approach, which is not directly founded on communication actions, regulations are
reified into the commitment. By contrast, in an organisational setting it is the organisation
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that judges compliance to commitments, according to norms that are specified separately,
and, further, may impose sanctions.
Singh studies norms for governance in the context of socio-technical systems [63]. His
notion of ‘governance’ is related to regulation in an organizational setting, but differs from
traditional organizational environments such as we have studied them, in that governance is
“the administration of such a system by the stakeholders themselves.” Singh characterizes
a lifecycle for norms where the terminal state is computed based on a truth table of the
antecedent and consequent.
Chopra et al. [24] are interested in modelling exchange of services in a distributed setting.
They model service-oriented application protocols in terms of messages and their effect on
commitments.Whereas, Chopra and Singh [25] are interested in simplifying the specification
of commitment-based protocols or requirements. To be explored is how our approach can be
combined with these works to aid specifying agent and organisation behaviour in realistic
settings.
7 Future work
This article considered two principal communication actions: offer and tell. Alternative
semantics can be defined for these actions using other constitutive rules, and compared to the
ones we defined. Our methodological approach will still be applicable. Moreover, our model
can be extended to a wider range of communication actions and provide their semantics in
terms of social commitments. Extending the set of communication actions should be done
carefully since commitments may create unwanted interferences.
Second, at a technical level, certain assumptions and modelling choices can be examined
further. For example, the content of communication actions and commitments are assumed
to be identical. This limits the framework to model only cases where single communication
actions, and never several together, should lead to state transition, e.g., offer(p ∧ q) and
tell(p), tell(q).
Third, commitments, as we have adopted them, possess special slots for deadlines. Alter-
natively, as proposed by Marengo et al. [52], the deadline could be part of the propositional
content (the antecedent and consequent) of the commitment. In that case, the deadline would
not have a special status. For example, we could express the commitment that the insurer will
have paid the assessment within 7 days, and (further) approved it within 14 days. Whether
such composite commitments can be expressed by several commitments in our language, and
in general the advantages and disadvantages of the two definitions from the point of view of
the organisational setting, is left for further research.
Fourth, we considered here generic counts-as rules that were designed based on the seman-
tics of specific communication actions (i.e., offer and tell). A possible extension would be to
investigate the interaction between such generic counts-as rules and domain-specific counts-
as rules representing domain-specific norms. For example, we can consider norms such as
‘buying a book while having no money on a credit card counts-as a violation’. Among the
questions that arise are such as when an agent without money on its credit card then offers
another agent to buy its book, i.e., creating a commitment that it cannot fulfil without violat-
ing the norm. It is not clear how such a commitment and violation should interact and what
would be outcome of such interactions, e.g., should the organisation decide to change the
state of the commitment to a violated state?
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Fifth, the lifecycle of commitments does not include the notion of delegation of a commit-
ment from one agent to another [48]. For instance, in the scenario, if the car cannot be repaired
by the repair garage, perhaps a more specialized garage for the model of car would have the
expertise. The transference of the car to a specialized garage occurs with the delegation of
commitment C4 from Repairer to Repairer2.
Finally, the dynamics of organisations is an important topicwhichwe have not treated here.
We believe that representing and analysing mechanisms in our framework to dynamically
change the rules of the norms and regulation policies at run-time would be an important issue
to explore.
8 Summary
Multi-agent systems in an organisational setting typically possess an entity defining interac-
tion protocols, monitoring agent interaction, and enforcing interaction norms by means of
regulation policies. We call this entity the ‘organisation’ or ‘institution’. For our purposes, an
organisation consists of two main processes: themonitoring process checks for conformance
of agents’ behaviour to protocols or norms, while the enforcement process ensures the coor-
dination by means of implementing the regulation policies. We are indifferent to whether the
organisation is either a virtual or a real organisation [56].
In this article, we propose to model the interaction protocols of the organisation by
explicitly-represented interaction norms. This norm representation has two advantages. The
first advantage is that we can operationalise the enforcement of protocols by means of norm
enforcement, and the second advantage is that we can analyse the protocol by a logical
analysis of the norms. To make this idea more precise, we adopt insights and methods from
commitment-based approaches as well as from norm-based approaches.
First, we showhow to use explicitly represented norms tomodel variety in the commitment
lifecycle. As far as the organisation component is concerned, agent interactions affect the
state of the institutional facts, in particular the commitments, whereas regulation policy is
responsible for updating the organisation state as a consequence of detected violations. By
modelling the interaction protocols of the organisation as a set of explicitly represented
norms, to which the agents’ interaction should adhere, we are able to generalise interaction
protocols to represent, for example, which agents can detach or satisfy commitments, whether
obligations can be satisfied before they are detached or not, and temporal conditions such as
whether a commitment which is fulfilled exactly at the moment of the deadline, counts as
violated or not.
Second, we introduce an operational semantics to operationalise protocol enforcement.
In this way, we show how to operationalise the enforcement of protocols by means of norm
enforcement. An organisational state consists of a set of brute facts, a set of institutional
facts, a set of contexts, a set of norms and a set of regulation policies. Given a way to define
the set of applicable rules in a context, two transition rules define how to update the brute
and institutional facts. In the same way, we could add rules for changing the contexts and the
sets of norms and policies.
Third, we show how to analyse interaction protocol of the organisation and thus commit-
ment cycles by logically analysing the norms. This also gives us a way to logically analyse
the enforcement of the protocol. Since the norms are represented explicitly, and the change
depends on the norms only, we can use techniques and insights from deontic logic [44]. Tem-
poral properties show that we can formally check that the operational semantics corresponds
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to the commitment lifecycle. Moreover, we can analyse interference between distinct com-
mitments, which may lead to problems in protocol analysis. Finally, redundancy of norms
tells us whether the protocol behaves as expected. For example, if one makes an offer, it is
redundant to make the same offer again, or to make an offer which is strictly worse for the
other party.
Hence, the contribution of the article is the systematic methodology to formally model
and analyse commitment lifecycles in terms of norms and regulation policies that govern the
creation and dynamics of commitments emerged during agents’ interaction. Our proposed
framework is based on a generic operational semantics that operationalize the enforcement
of norms and regulation policies, and thereby operationalize the dynamics of commitments.
Our framework is generic in the sense that it allows formal instantiation and comparison of
different approaches to commitment dynamics.
The model, semantics and analysis have been illustrated by a running example from a
vehicle insurance domain. The sample execution traces showed the monitoring of agent
communication and non-communication actions, and the application of regulation policies.
Throughout the article, we have emphasised the methodological innovation of our
approach. We address the usual questions regarding agent communication, coordination and
monitoring, and we adopt the usual formal methods like constitutive norms. However, the
way we establish our formal framework is different from all other work, as we do not con-
strain ourselves to one particular commitment lifecycle. Of course, this does not mean that
any set of norms and policies defined in our framework will behave well. It is part of our
methodology that the behaviour of the organisation is left to the person, who defines the
norms and policies. The properties show that the commitment cycle we use in the main part
of our discussion, consisting of contexts {c1, c2, c3}, is well behaved. Whether other norms
or policies are as well behaved has to be checked independently.
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